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Foreword

Swarthmore College is proud to present this edition of The
Swarthmore Papers, the first of a projected annual series
intended to provide a national forum for discussion of the
purposes of undergraduate education in a changing world.
Each volume of the Papers will explore, from the perspective
of a selected theme, how our undergraduate institutions
might respond to the responsibilities and opportunities in
herent in that world. In taking this initiative, the College is
building upon its long-standing commitment to an excel
lent undergraduate education that puts intellectual rigor to
the task of creating a more just and humane world. I wel
come you to engage in this dialogue with us.
Alfred H. Bloom
President

Introduction

n May 2, 1992, Swarthmore College conducted a day
of activities to inaugurate Alfred H. Bloom III as its
13th president. After teaching linguistics and psychology
and directing the Linguistics Program at Swarthmore for
about a decade and serving for a few years as Swarthmore's
associate provost. Bloom had left Swarthmore to become
academic vice president at Pitzer College. Following an
innovative and successful five years at Pitzer, Bloom came
back home to Swarthmore in August of 1991, in the office of
president.
It is more than a little unorthodox to schedule an inau
gural ceremony for the end, rather than the beginning, of
the president's first year, but Bloom had good reasons for
this departure from tradition. He wanted his inauguration
to be more than just a ceremony, to be filled not just with
pomp, but also with circumstance. He wanted an inaugura
tion that was substantive and that would be the keynote of
an extended and continuing community process rather than
an isolated "flashbulb" moment of good cheer, sweet
words, and good food. To make the inaugural day substan
tive would require deferring it to the spring, principally so
that Bloom could spend a year learning (or better, relearn
ing) about the institution, the faculty, and the students, the
better to formulate a serious message about the direction
Swarthmore might take and the role it might play in Ameri
can higher education in the future.
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Furthermore, Bloom thought it would be wasteful of
time, effort, and expense to bring Swarthmore's extended
community together just to hear him deliver a speech. It
would be much more interesting and productive to take
advantage of the occasion and bring several distinguished
scholars to the campus to address the issues that were at the
center of his concerns and would be at the heart of his own
address. Thus, the plan was hatched to organize a pair of
symposia. The presentations at these symposia, together
with his inaugural address, would constitute the beginning
of a process of community discussion and self-examination,
leading ultimately to some form of action that might re
direct Swarthmore's educational efforts as it entered the
2ist century.
The theme of the day—of Bloom's address and of the
symposia—was an attempt to bring together two insistent
questions confronting contemporary American education,
and indeed all of contemporary American society: What
should American education (and society) do about
"multiculturalism"—to acknowledge and inform people
about the diversity of the world's (and America's) cultures?
And how should American education (and society) foster
civic responsibility? These two questions are addressed
frequently these days at all levels of American education
and in many other of our social institutions. As our own
society becomes ever more diverse, and as technological,
political, and economic developments propel us toward a
"global economy" with a "global culture," finding a way to
acknowledge, respect, and even celebrate ethnic and cul
tural differences becomes increasingly important. Thus the
concern with multiculturalism. And as the "ethic of selfish
ness" breaks down communities and sours citizens on any
form of political or social commitment and participation,
finding a way to bring people together and engender public
involvement becomes increasingly urgent. Thus the con
cern with civic responsibility. But these two questions are
rarely addressed together. The reason for this, perhaps, is
that the problems they pose seem to push us in opposite
directions. Acknowledging multiculturalism often involves
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highlighting differences among groups of people. Fostering
civic responsibility often involves highlighting com
monalities among groups of people. What this suggests is
that the closer one moves toward genuine multicultural
appreciation and sensitivity, the further one moves from
civic responsibility, and conversely. Is it possible for an
institution or an entire society to seek to achieve both of
these goals simultaneously? And if so, how?
Thus, the theme of the inauguration day was formed:
Educating for Civic Responsibility in a Multicultural World.
Bloom's inaugural address provided the keynote, and of
fered the suggestion that the contradiction between mul
ticulturalism and civic responsibility was only apparent. He
suggested that it was by studying deeply the values and
practices of different cultures that one could best find and
understand that which was universal in human beings and
their cultures and might provide the foundation for a re
newed sense of civic responsibility—a renewed sense that
we are all in this together.
The symposia that followed the inaugural address were
(loosely) organized around two different themes. The first
focused on how educational institutions can educate stu
dents for civic responsibility in a multicultural world, while
the second focused on how educational institutions can
themselves embody civic responsibility in a multicultural
world. The presentations of the invited speakers at each
symposium were introduced and discussed by members of
the Swarthmore faculty, who had received advance copies of
most of the talks and of Bloom's address. The invited speak
ers themselves did not have access either to Bloom's
address, or to each other's, prior to the symposia. What
appears in this volume are the various addresses given on
May 2, only slightly revised by their authors and lightly
edited by me after the event itself.
Before the reader turns to the addresses themselves, it
is important that I provide a bit of social context. In the
weeks just prior to Swarthmore's inaugural celebration, a
jury in Simi Valley, Calif., had handed down a "not-guilty"
verdict in the trial of several Los Angeles police officers
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accused of beating Rodney King. This stunning verdict,
produced by an all-white jury despite videotaped evidence
of the brutal beating that had actually occurred, triggered
the riots, violence, and property destruction that decimated
several Los Angeles inner city neighborhoods and
threatened to spread across the nation. In this context of
racial and ethnic injustice, violence, and hostility that the
entire nation witnessed daily on its television screens, our
inaugural focus on multiculturalism and civic responsibil
ity seemed to many simultaneously remarkably timely and
woefully inadequate. The day-to-day events going on in the
"real world" made many feel that it was too late for just talk;
but at the same time, people felt that without such talk,
desperately needed social action would likely be ineffective
and perhaps even be misdirected. Several of the speakers
saw fit to mention the events then occurring in Los Angeles.
And perhaps all of the speakers harbored the hope that the
kinds of institutional initiatives being suggested on this
day would make future Simi Valley verdicts and urban riots
much less likely.
A central aim of Alfred Bloom's inaugural address was
to introduce to his audience the Chinese concept of li—
which refers to rites and rituals that celebrate events but
also do more, by connecting those events to deeply valued
traditions, thereby investing those events with responsibil
ity for carrying the traditions forward. It was Bloom's hope
that his address, and the symposia that followed it, would
be examples of li, in this rich sense. It is my hope that this
volume will be an example of li as well.

Barry Schwartz
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania
August 1, 1992
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A New Mandate
For American Education
Alfred H. Bloom
President
Swarthmore College

’hank you Neil, Sam—all of you for joining with me in
this rite of passage for Swarthmore. There is no college
I could be more proud to lead and no college better posi
tioned by its own distinctive strengths to create a new
mandate for American education.
I composed this talk over the past several months, but
the events of the past three days across the country make
starkly evident the need to act on the message I intend to
convey.
Perhaps you have noticed that there is a Chinese
character on your program. It is pronounced "li," and it
refers to the rites and rituals through which a community
steps from its day-to-day experience to celebrate an impor
tant event, rites and rituals such as those through which we
are celebrating today this inauguration. The character is
written in Chinese rather than in English not to be preten
tious nor as a subtle enticement to increase Chinese enroll
ments nor even out of deference to our distinguished
Chinese lion, but because looking at rites and rituals from
the perspective of the Chinese character li opens up dimen
sions that are not immediately apparent from its English
equivalent terms, dimensions that are important to what I
hope we will all experience today.
From the Chinese perspective, li, or rites and rituals,
do more than celebrate events. They also connect events to
deeply valued traditions and thereby invest those events
with the responsibility for carrying those traditions for-
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ward. And even more fundamentally, as Confucius saw
them, rites and rituals also transform events into contexts in
which ethical growth takes place. If they do not perform that
function, if they do not enable those who participate in
them to come to a keener sense of how to act and of how to
educate others to act to bring about a more harmonious and
righteous world, then those rites and rituals fail in their
most essential reason for being. And as a further aspect of
their ethical consciousness-raising responsibility, rites and
rituals in Chinese tradition must also evoke an ethical
vision, a vision that will lay the groundwork for a new
initiative. Taking a cross-cultural perspective on what rites
and rituals must accomplish raises the standards we set for
ourselves.
Let us, as we perform together this rite of passage for
Swarthmore, respond to the full meaning of li. Let us step
from our daily lives to join through pomp, music, dance,
food and thought to celebrate the past and the future of this
wonderful institution. Let the interval of silence, the read
ing, our search for collective understanding through our
meeting together, and the theme of this inauguration
itself—let them all remind us of our connection to the
Quaker tradition out of which this College was born, by
which it was nurtured, and from which it draws the
strength of its conviction to be a humane community and to
contribute through its students—and as an institution—to
a more humane and peaceful world. Let our marching to
gether with other institutions remind us of our place in the
tradition of American liberal arts education and of our re
sponsibility to shape the future course of that tradition. Let
the discourse of ideas and forms that structures today's
events remind us of the creative rigor of our own intellectual
tradition. Let the splendid array of cultural expressions
articulated in today's events remind us of the richness of
those cultural traditions that have played a part in Swarth
more and that will play an even more central role in its
future. And, in accord with the deepest responsibilities of
li, let us engage with today's inaugural rites and rituals in a
way that makes us more keenly aware of our potential, and
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of our mandate, to educate for civic responsibility in our
multicultural world.
We live in a nation that still has the resources to con
quer the poverty, the homelessness, the insecurity, and the
lack of opportunity that lie within it and to stem the envi
ronmental damage that it continues to bring upon itself. Yet
we need a critical mass of Americans who will make these
societal priorities their own.
•

Our students must be more than
well-trained,
analytically astute, creative in their disciplines,
and broadly educated.
They must also possess what I would like to call
ethical intelligence,
an ethical intelligence responsive to our times.
•
We live in a nation that has grown strong because Of its
ethnic, cultural, religious and racial mix; yet it's a nation
whose bridges of mutual respect and common purpose
have largely been built to unite only the diverse compo
nents of its white, straight, majority population. We need a
critical mass of Americans who will transform this country
into a nation in which all Americans are equally valued.
We live in a nation the majority of whose population
traces its ancestry to the rest of the world, whose economic
successes dependent upon that world, and which serves as
the economic and democratic model to much of that world;
yet we live in a nation whose population is sorely ignorant of
the world that lies off its shores. Few Americans are suffi
ciently fluent in other cultures and in other languages to
enter with confidence and sensitivity into other cultural
worlds, particularly those outside of Western Europe. Few
have the knowledge and experience to enable them to ac
cord the respect to the Third World that they accord to the
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First. We need a critical mass of Americans who are pre
pared to exercise leadership in an internationalist world.
I suggest to you that America's undergraduate institu
tions must prepare that critical mass of Americans to
respond to the needs of a society and of a world in need. If
they don't, who will?
Our undergraduate institutions must continue to en
sure that our students graduate with the skills, the under
standing, and the knowledge they require to pursue the
disciplines and careers of their choice, that they graduate
prepared to apprehend the subtlety and complexity of intel
lectual arguments and of others' points of view, that they
graduate ready to generate the new intellectual syntheses
and the new aesthetic forms that constitute the sources of
exhilaration in the life of the mind and the bases of its
advance, and that they graduate open to the broadest spec
trum of human knowledge and creativity and are therefore
equipped to enjoy life to the fullest.

I suggest to you
that all modern cultures not only share
a vast array of their material
and psychological concerns but also share
the deep structures of their linguistic,
conceptual, emotional, and ethical lives.

But—to address the needs of a society and of a world in
need, our students must be more than well-trained, ana
lytically astute, creative in their disciplines, and broadly
educated. They must also possess what I would like to call
ethical intelligence, an ethical intelligence responsive to our
times.
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We cannot delude ourselves that highly refined cogni
tive abilities will translate automatically into the sort of
intelligence required. We must dispel the argument that in
educating for ethical intelligence we are imposing values of
our own, for that argument confounds the distinction be
tween creating ethical thinkers and dictating to them the
content of their thoughts. We must counter both veiled and
explicit arguments for value-free education. Those argu
ments speak for an education that bears no responsibility
beyond that of maintaining the status quo. And across the
country, from Los Angeles to Swarthmore, in addition to
the many other things that they do, our undergraduate
institutions must set themselves the task of identifying the
kind of ethical intelligence that is required for our times and
educate for it with the same rigor and the same energy that
they devote to the development of the critical mind.
The ethical intelligence that we seek must involve, in
part, a vertical shift of consciousness from unexamined
assumptions about what is right and what is wrong to a
consciously chosen set of values, values in terms of which
the ethical thinker then sets priorities for herself and for
society, values to which she remains committed while she
grapples with her own needs, values that she is prepared to
articulate in ways that persuade others of their moral force.
For Plato this very shift in consciousness from unexamined
assumptions to consciously chosen values is essential to the
apprehension of universal forms. For Martin Luther King, it
is at the core of how America's conscience can be raised. For
Confucius, it is fundamental to the cultivation of the
jundz, the individual who has attained ethical wisdom
and then acts as a compelling model for others' ethical
growth. Our undergraduate institutions must ensure that
this vertical shift to consciously chosen values is a central
event in each of our student's undergraduate lives.
But because this ethical achievement normally remains
confined within a single, monocultural tradition, it cannot
in itself, I fear, adequately prepare students for taking ethi
cal responsibility in a multicultural world. For this larger
responsibility, a horizontal move is also required, one that
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neither Plato nor Confucius saw the need to make—a move
through which students must look beyond their own cul
tural worlds to recognize both the continuities that bind
their culture to other human cultures and the discon
tinuities that separate their cultures from those others and
therefore make for a richer world.
1 suggest to you that all modern cultures not only share
a vast array of their material and psychological concerns but
also share the deep structures of their linguistic, concep
tual, emotional, and ethical lives. Members of every culture
enjoy eating together and participating together in cere
monies. Every culture makes use of a set of meaningless
sounds to compose its words and of a set of abstract rules to
define which of its sentences are grammatical and which are
not. Every culture divides the conceptual world into
categories, performs mental operations on those categories,
and has its own notions of clear and persuasive thought.
Every culture responds in subtle ways to the range of
human sensibilities and expresses its ideas and its emotions
in humor, music, and art. Every culture is concerned with
the balance between personal autonomy and the health of
community. Although configuring them differently, every
culture incorporates notions of love, hope, compassion,
fairness, justice, and truth. Every culture has its standards
for right action and feels resentment at treatment deemed
unjust.
It is because these basic continuities, among many
others, do exist across cultures that we can enter other
cultural worlds. For students to recognize these continuities
is for them to recognize that the potential for profound
understanding exists across cultural worlds. For them to
recognize these continuities is for them to know that they
cannot discount someone from another gender, race, cul
ture, class, or sexual orientation as less of a human being
than themselves.
These continuities are often shrouded in cultural dif
ferences. They are difficult to perceive when discomfort
over difference keeps us at a distance and hard to apprehend
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when a stereotype targeted at a particular behavior or at
titude generalizes to denigrate the person or the culture as a
whole. But we have an obligation to find ways to ensure that
our students recognize these continuities and internalize
the expectation that they will be there. Only then will our
students sense, not abstractly but intuitively, the enormous
common ground between men and women, blacks and
whites, Chicanos and Puerto Ricans, Chinese and Euro
peans, straights and gays and lesbians, individuals of one
social class and those of another—the enormous, human
common ground upon which they can and must build the
relationships of trust, friendship, and shared purpose that
are essential in a pluralistic and internationalist world.

Recognizing discontinuities
will prepare and motivate our students
to engage with those other worlds,
to draw from them insights and perspectives
that will enhance both their own lives
and the societies in which we live.

And, just as recognizing these continuities will assure
our students that there is a human world on the other side of
the cultural and class divide, recognizing discontinuities
will prepare and motivate our students to engage with those
other worlds, to draw from them insights and perspectives
that will enhance both their own lives and the societies in
which we live.
Consider, for example, what a student might learn
from a quick glimpse into something so apparently incon
sequential as the Asian distaste for the American custom of
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splitting the check after lunch. From the Chinese and
Japanese perspective, to split a check is simply to express
the alienating sentiment "You go your way. I'll go mine.
Let's split the check so we can protect ourselves from incur
ring any further obligation to one another!" And as the
Chinese and Japanese see it, if that is the sentiment you
want to express, why have lunch together in the first place?
Rather, one party should treat while the other party should
accept the responsibility to be treated and then to recipro
cate, exactly because by so doing a mutual obligation is
created—an obligation that not only ensures another lunch
together but also expresses the willingness of each party to
relinquish some of his autonomy to the other, to become
somewhat more dependent on the other as a means of
strengthening their relationship and therefore of making
the lunch particularly worthwhile.
And, by the way, as soon as Swarthmore learned of this
approach to creating mutual indebtedness, we decided to
treat all of you to lunch today!
But leaving intercultural gastronomy aside, for the
moment at any rate, when students enter the perspectives of
other cultural worlds, they may begin as well to appreciate
how persuasively the narratives of other cultures and
classes capture the significances, the ironies, the ambigu
ities, and the multidimensional complexities of the human
world in which they live. And as a consequence, they may
begin to accord to less abstract, less theoretical modes of
expression the respectability and the attention they have
been taught to accord only to theoretical argument and
proof. When they enter the perspectives of other cultural
worlds, they may come to see that bright colors on Thai or
Chinese temples do not express levity or frivolity but in
stead the vitality and the breadth of the human spirit. They
may come to see that emphasizing the performance of social
responsibilities may be as important to a community or to a
society as safeguarding individual rights. They may come
to recognize that the right to a good education, to medical
care, and to a decent life are as important as the abstract
right to vote. They may come to seek styles of leadership
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that guide by persuasion and empowerment rather than by
the assertion of authority. When students enter the perspec
tives of those who have endured historic injustice, they may
empathize with the emotionally charged experiences that lie
behind persistent cries for justice and feel a new, personal
responsibility not to turn away from those cries. When they
enter the perspectives of those around the world who long
for political and economic stability but have not had the
opportunity to become habituated to them or even compla
cent about them, students may begin to understand why
educating for civic responsibility might be as essential as
educating for an intellectually more sophisticated under
standing of the world.
At times these leaps into other cultural worlds will
open new dimensions of understanding, new sensibilities,
and new possibilities. At times they will validate ways of
thinking and interacting that students themselves may have
found intuitively compelling but that they have discounted
as being of lesser worth or utility because they were taught
that such ways of thinking and interacting are not
privileged by their own cultural worlds.
But whether these leaps into other cultural worlds offer
new ideas or new legitimating perspectives on old ones,
they will shake students' assumptions that their culture's
way is the natural way to think about and react to experi
ence, that their culture has the edge on clear thinking, on
universal ethical understanding, and on subtlety of emo
tional and aesthetic response. These assumptions will not
be easy to shake, because all cultures make use of them to
provide their individuals with a sense of who they are and
of what it is normal for them to think and to feel. Yet it is only
through a shaking of these assumptions that students will
internalize the reality that there is something of genuine
value to themselves that lies beyond their own cultural
world. Only through a shaking of these assumptions will
they be prepared to build bridges of understanding, trust,
and friendship of the kind that emerge among people who
believe they are fundamentally equal. Only through leaps
into other cultural worlds will students develop a respect for
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those other worlds that is not based on an abstract commit
ment to tolerance that keeps those worlds at a distance but
rather is grounded in a specific appreciation of what they
have distinctly to offer. And only on the basis of such leaps
will they begin to formulate the more inclusive, ethical
syntheses that they will require for taking responsibility in
a multicultural world.

When students enter
the perspectives of those who have endured
historic injustice,
they may empathize with the emotionally
charged experiences
that lie behind persistent cries for justice and
feel a new, personal responsibility not
to turn away from those cries.

Through expanded study of languages and cultures on
campus, through structured explorations off campus,
through effective foreign study experiences, and through
the creation of richly diverse campus communities, we
must ensure that our students make these leaps, that they
acquire that second, horizontal dimension of ethical intelli
gence needed for their times.
But I suggest to you that even this second dimension of
ethical intelligence is not sufficient. For our students must
be prepared not only for the vertical move to value con
sciousness and for the horizontal move into other cultural
worlds but also for transforming the values they select,
from their own and from other cultural worlds, into effec
tive and committed strategies for social change.
For this latter task, they will require detailed under
standing of the problems facing their society and the world.
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They will require an exposure to those problems so vivid
that it will develop in them a lifelong commitment to re
sponding to them; they will require experience in moving
beyond single-dimension approaches to complex value
conflicts to envision and create balanced perspectives that
accommodate competing claims; and they will require
practice in implementing those balanced perspectives
through the trade-offs, uncertainties, and complexities that
they are bound to confront along the way.
We have to prepare our students to balance, for in
stance, a long-term commitment to the health of the envi
ronment against the immediate benefits of a more comfort
able and flexible lifestyle, against the relative costs and
likely effectiveness of different environmental initiatives,
against other community and societal priorities that also
demand their attention and our resources. We have to pre
pare our students to balance a community's need to punish
violations of its norms against that community's simulta
neous need to provide channels for education, reintegra
tion, and forgiveness. We have to prepare our students to
balance the need to treat all individuals as individuals with
out reference to their gender, race, and culture against the
simultaneous need to recognize and celebrate group iden
tities so as to consciously and actively undercut the prej
udices targeted against them and so as to give expression,
place, and support to voices that have not been adequately
heard. We have to prepare our students to balance so deeply
valued a principle as freedom of speech against the destruc
tive impact that speech hostile to race, religion, culture, or
sexual orientation can have in undermining one's ability to
participate fully in community and intellectual life. We have
to prepare our students to balance an internationalist vision
that strives for a common human identity and purpose
against a world that must also accommodate national and
group identity and pride.
And if the task of achieving an appropriate balance
among such competing values is this complex, the task of
implementing those balances is more complex still. For the
latter involves moving beyond abstract ethical formulations
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to dealing with personalities, institutions, and politics, to
working with scarce resources, to accepting probabilities
and qualified accomplishments, to recognizing the trade
offs between means and ends and the hard choices over
which values to advance when, at what risk or expense to
others.
To the extent we have not already done so and to the
extent to which it is feasible to do, as we develop courses
across our disciplines, construct overall curricular visions,
shape off-campus experiences, and design programs in
student life, our undergraduate institutions must find ways
to engage our students with the full contours of the prob
lems facing their society and the world. We must find ways
to structure those engagements so that our students de
velop comfort in creating balanced ethical responses to the
problems they confront, balanced responses that set
priorities among competing claims and at the same time, in
the measure possible, also accommodate the legitimate
claims that cannot be fully met. And we must find ways to
structure those engagements so that our students gain con
crete practice in implementing their balanced perspectives
through bringing about constructive change within cir
cumscribed domains. If our students do not graduate with
the confidence to translate the knowledge, the insight, and
the analytic power of their academic experience into effec
tive strategies for social change, how can we expect them to
be prepared for, or to commit to, a continuing responsibility
to be agents of such change?
We must provide these structured opportunities, be
cause if we don't our educational institutions across the
country will lose the confidence of their students and be
cause our students are asking for something that they, and
our society, need. They are not asking us to cut back on
what we do or to lessen the rigor of our educational efforts.
In fact, it's very much the reverse; they are asking for an
enhancement of our program, an enhancement that takes
place at the same level of analytic rigor that we apply to our
other educational efforts—an enhancement that will de
mand of us, in turn, a good deal of thought and judicious
experimentation.
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There is nothing more exciting for this Swarthmore
president than to know that there is a crucial challenge
facing American education and that our institution is
perhaps better equipped than any other to lead American
education in addressing that challenge. We have a superb
faculty and student body, an outstanding staff, and a Board
distinguished by its unfailing dedication to the College and
its educational vision. As I look across the country and in
fact the world, there is no undergraduate institution I know
that so conjoins a rigorous and imaginative intellectual life
with an unqualified commitment to the education of its
undergraduates. There is no undergraduate institution that

We have to prepare our students
to balance so deeply valued a principle
as freedom of speech against
the destructive impact that speech hostile
to race, religion, culture, or sexual orientation
can have in undermining one's ability to
participate fully
in community and intellectual life.

is so fully and so unashamedly committed to the pursuit of
ideas and that so enjoys national recognition as a college
whose ideas and educational leadership are to be trusted.
And there is no undergraduate institution that has all of this
and at the same time such experience in cultivating ethical
intelligence. Our Quaker tradition has placed the cultiva
tion of ethical intelligence at the core of our mission, and our
curriculum and the events that animate campus life reflect
our sincere engagement with it. Most significantly, to meet
Swarthmore alumni is to know that we are succeeding
extraordinarily well in preparing our graduates not only

THE SWARTHMORE PAPERS

M

with the intellectual foundations for a continuing, intense
engagement with the life of the mind—its perplexities and
its rewards—but also with the ethical intelligence required
to put that life of the mind to work to create a better world.
But for Swarthmore to remain the educational leader
that it is, we must not only continue to do well what we
currently do, but we must also pursue deliberately the task
of educating for an ethical intelligence responsive to our
times.

We must take the lead in creating a
new mandate for American education.
It is appropriate and incumbent upon
Swarthmore to assume this leadership role.

We must as a community explore how to proceed, and
we must take the lead in creating a new mandate for Ameri
can education. It is appropriate and incumbent upon
Swarthmore to assume this leadership role. In the process
we must at all times respect the quality of our own intellec
tual tradition. We must remember the contribution to this
quality that has been made, and that I believe must continue
to be made, by the special pedagogical relationship be
tween seminars and other projects on the one hand and
external examinations on the other. We must continue to
educate our students for that vertical shift to consciously
chosen values. Only those new directions that sustain,
broaden, and enhance Swarthmore's intellectual quality are
the ones that we will want to pursue. But we also must
remember that if intellectual quality is timeless, it is also,
and importantly, a function of its time. If we do not prepare
our students for entering other cultural worlds and for
translating the more inclusive, balanced ethical frameworks
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they will then construct into effective strategies for social
change—if we do not, in other words, better equip our
students with the kind of ethical intelligence they will
require to embrace, prosper in, and contribute to their
multicultural world—then we cannot sustain the intellec
tual quality that we have.
At stake in this challenge is the distinctiveness not only
of Swarthmore but also of American liberal arts education
itself. For unless we begin to meet the needs of our society,
our society will increasingly refuse to meet our needs. Only
if we become the sources of ethical vision for our society and
only if we graduate students who have the ethical in
telligence to create a better society will undergraduate edu
cation once again distinguish itself in the public eye as
something more than just another function of society, as
something of qualitatively distinct value. Only then will
education be perceived as unequivocally worthy of national
investment and as the evident path for producing our coun
try's leaders. And only then will American education once
again be granted the autonomy, the respect, and the dignity
that is rightly accorded to all great ethical teachers.
Let me in conclusion return to a further meaning of li,
one that is shared as well by our concept of rites and rituals.
Both li and rites and rituals serve to build community, and if
we again borrow from the Chinese perspective, that com
munity becomes more tightly bound for having shared
together through rites and rituals in the joy and significance
of an event, for having connected together through rites and
rituals to its own valued traditions, and for having experi
enced together through rites and rituals a sense of collective
ethical growth. At the deepest level, I hope this inaugura
tion, our li, will lay the foundation for a stronger sense of
community at Swarthmore across faculty, staff, students,
alumni, members of the Board, and the many friends of the
College who have been close to us—a community that
draws on the richness of our differences and a community
that brings us together in a shared vision of how we might
act and of how we might educate others to act to reinvigo
rate the social conscience of American education.
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Biographical Note

Alfred H. Bloom III is the 13th president of Swarthmore
College. After spending a decade on the Swarthmore fac
ulty as a professor of linguistics and psychology and di
rector of the Program in Linguistics, Bloom became as
sociate provost of the College. He then left to become
academic vice president and then executive vice president of
Pitzer College of the Claremont Colleges. He returned to
Swarthmore after this five-year “sabbatical" to become its
president in August 1991. Bloom's research in linguistics
and psychology has focused on cross-cultural differences in
moral reasoning and on the role of language in influencing
moral judgment. He is the author of The Linguistic Shaping
of Thought (1981) as well as several articles in scholarly
journals.

SYMPOSIUM I
How Colleges Educate Students
for Civic Responsibility
in a
Multicultural World

Introduction
T. Kaori Kitao
Professor of Art History
Swarthmore College

Minasan oshizukani dozo [Silence please, everyone].
Dozo oshizukani onegai-shimasu [Please quiet down].
(The crowd quiets down).

Isn't it marvelous?
Either you are all fluent in Japanese, which is unlikely,
or you understand exactly what I mean
without understanding my words.

Here is a lesson to be learned, a lesson in multiculturalism.
Words are not the only means of communication,
as those in the academe are so prone to assume.
Behavior speaks, too, sometimes more loudly than words,
often more vividly.

It is true, in principio erat verbum.
It is also true that in principio erat visio.
But this was taken for granted and, so,
deemed unnecessary to state in words.
And it was never said.
But sometimes it should be said,
as in the service of multiculturalism.

I am Kaori Kitao, and I am an academic.
As any academic, I am addicted to footnotes.
So, here is a footnote to this morning's address
by our esteemed President Inaugurate Al Bloom.
19
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It has to do with li, which in Japanese is rei.
We were told this morning
that this word, li, has to do with rites and rituals.
But it also has to do with good behavior.
This is manifest in the phrases that we form with li.

There is li yi, or reigi in Japanese.
And there is li jie, or reisetsu.
These phrases refer to the code of behavior.
The second phrase, li jie, implies moderation.

Then, there is shr li, that is, losing sight of li,
and this means discourteousness.
The Japanese equivalent, shitsurei, in common usage, is
the phatic “excuse me."

If you lack li altogether, it's wu li (or burei in Japanese);
and that's rudeness.
So, subsumed in this little word li,
two important lessons are in store for us.
One I have already stated.
Behavior speaks; words, perhaps, only say.
Good behavior, in fact, speaks a lot.
The second lesson is “smack in the periphery."
I sometimes have difficulty understanding
all the fuss about multiculturalism.
I sort of feel funny about it.
I always experience a distinct sense of discomfort
talking about it.

On reflection I realize where my difficulty lies.
The difficulty is that I am multicultural.
That is why there is little for me to talk about it.
I am multicultural by default; I have no choice.
I am an immigrant;
and I stand astride two very different cultures.
But, then, I feel fortunate about my lot.
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For the condition of being an immigrant is certainly
a best preparation for multiculturalism.
Being an immigrant is to stand smack in the periphery.
You don't take the center stage.
You look in from outside while you are already in.
You are well within and yet
hold on to the outlook of an outsider.

Americans are notoriously attached to the idea
of occupying the center, like the Chinese ages ago
with their kingdom in the center of the world.

Americans are mostly immigrants in origin;
and yet the condition of being an immigrant
is something everyone seems to forget quickly
once she or he settles here for good
and becomes a part of this social fabric.
When an American goes abroad and settles there,
she or he is an expatriate—off the center, the other.
Smack in the periphery does not mean losing the center.
It means recognizing the center
without being smack in the center.
It means recognizing that
if everyone tries to be the center,
there is only confusion.
If everyone tries to speak, nothing is heard.
If every culture strives for supremacy,
there is nothing but war.
Smack in the periphery means sharing the center;
it means networking.
It means making efforts
to understand how it feels to be the other.
It means learning the languages and manners
other than one's own,
however queer, distant, or difficult.
It means good behavior, li,
it means avoiding rudeness, wu li.
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Smack in the periphery does not mean passivity.
It means speaking not only to be heard but also to hear.
It means confidence to concede,
a reserve in recognition of respect for the other.
It means deference, not diffidence.
It means deference for the other,
however different that other may be.
That is the gist, as I take it, of Al Bloom's phrase,
ethical intelligence.
Smack in the periphery is the spirit of li.
But how do we inculcate ethical intelligence
in our students?
How can we shape our curriculum
that embodies and displays cultural differences
and the sense of the center among the differences?

So this is the topic of this first symposium:
How Colleges Educate Students for Civic Responsibility
in a Multicultural World.

The purpose of the two symposia was indeed
the president's desire and design
to go beyond the words of the ritual address,
and get down to action.
The Inaugural Committee is therefore
planning to publish the symposium papers
together with Al Bloom's address in a book form.

Now to expedite the procedure, I would like
to dispense with individual introductions.
I will quickly introduce speakers in the beginning
and take the liberty of simply calling on them,
in sequence, to speak.
I will do away, for once, with formality, li,
and will not reiterate
the achievements and accomplishments
of the speakers
since they appear in print in our program
—in words.

Introduction
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Biographical Note

T. Kaori Kitao is professor of art history at Swarthmore
College. Her area of specialization is art and architecture of
Baroque Rome, and she wrote Circle and Oval in the Square
of St. Peter's in Rome: Bernini's Art of Planning. But her
interests are cross-cultural and interdisciplinary (Renais
sance, American studies, semiotics). She was an active
member of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations and served as its vice president from
1980 to 1983. She teaches courses on Michelangelo, Dutch
painting, Philadelphia and American architecture, history
of cinema, industrial design, and semiotics; she also lec
tures and writes on various aspects of Japanese culture,
especially architecture and gardens, and is currently pre
paring a collection of her essays in cross-cultural visual
semiotics.

Diversity
And Our Discontents
Frank F. Wong
Vice President for Academic Affairs
University of Redlands

et us use a series of riddles to frame a discussion of why

is causing great discontent among us. First,
tuwhydiversity
is George Bush in Japan like Clarence Thomas before
the Senate Judiciary Committee? Second, why are we so
comfortable learning from other cultures abroad and so
uncomfortable about learning from different cultures in
our own country? Third, why do we cherish intellectual
diversity in higher education and yet feel so uncomfortable
with gender and ethnic diversity? Fourth, how can we con
ceptualize cultural diversity so that it allays rather than
increases our discontents?

Convergence of Minority and Majority Experience
To understand our deep, collective discontent about cul
tural diversity, let us turn to our first riddle. You will recall
President Bush's ill-starred trip to Japan, where, accom
panied by a retinue of automobile executives, he sought,
unsuccessfully, to persuade the Japanese to begin acting
like Americans in the way they organized their economy.
This hat-in-hand pilgrimage was cloaked in tough, political
rhetoric about extracting concessions from the Japanese.
But the discomfort of the American president appealing for
help from a people so widely "bashed" and denigrated in
this country was dramatically revealed when he vomited
into the lap of the Japanese prime minister and collapsed to
the floor.
24

Diversity and Our Discontents

25

Clarence Thomas' riveting appearance in the televised
Senate hearings involving Anita Hill is a counterpoint to
George Bush in Japan. Our comparison is not with the
sexual harassment issue but with the black-white issue. At
one juncture in the hearings. Judge Thomas raged at his
accusers, charging them with a "racist lynching," even as he
embraced a political establishment that made Willie Horton
a code word for covert racism. The irony of his comments
illustrates a crucial aspect of Judge Thomas' rapid rise to
national prominence: although his roots lie in a minority
culture of this country, by embracing the culture of the
majority, he achieved the American dream of success. He is
the real life equivalent of the African American architect in
Spike Lee's movie Jungle Fever, who also found uncomfort
able success in the majority culture, expressed through his
emotionless affair with a white secretary.
This is not a criticism of Judge Thomas. What Judge
Thomas has succeeded in doing is what every member of a
minority culture in this country intuitively knows to be a
necessity if one aspires to move in the mainstream rather
than remain in the backwaters. To operate in the main
stream there is no choice but to engage the majority culture,
to learn its language, to know its thoughts, to give it respect
if not deference. At this level, minorities in this country,
perhaps minorities in most countries, do not so much
choose to engage and integrate with the majority culture so
much as they are compelled to out of necessity.
By contrast, as sociologist Troy Duster has so astutely
observed, those in the cultural majority, by and large, have
had the freedom voluntarily to engage or integrate with the
minority cultures as it suited them in accordance with their
ideals, their prejudices, or their circumstances.^ This is not
a criticism of the stance of the cultural majority; it is merely
to illustrate what historically has been the significant differ
ence in minorities relating to majorities as compared to
majorities relating to minorities. Here is the crucial reason
for the underlying discontent in our society about cultural
diversity. What had been different and unequal kinds of
relationships have now become one and the same. We are
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now in an era where the majority also has no choice but to
engage minority cultures. The experience of cultural differ
ence is now a mainstream reality. What minorities have
experienced for generations is now being experienced by
those who are unaccustomed to the experience. This is the
great cultural transition of our time. It is small wonder that
we have such large measure of discomfort and discontent.
This is the symbolic meaning of President Bush's un
comfortable trip to Japan. His flu symptoms were a
metaphor for the psychological uneasiness of Americans
having to engage and respect, if not defer to, this different,
often denigrated Japanese culture that we are still trying
with little success to understand. For Judge Thomas the
discomfort of making common cause with a majority cul
ture that demeans an essential part of himself came out in
his rage against racism even as he advocated a philosophy
of individual achievement in which race was deemed irrel
evant. President Bush and Judge Thomas are bedfellows,
not only in their political and judicial outlooks, but in their
common discomfort with having to engage a different cul
ture that often seems to threaten some part of their own.
Judge Thomas could not succeed without effectively engag
ing Anglo-American culture, while President Bush did not
succeed because because he didn't know how to engage
Japanese culture.

Convergence of Foreign and Domestic Experience
Other implications flow from this unlikely comparison. In
higher education we have long been accustomed to accept
ing the difference of cultures abroad. We even advocate the
educational value to our students of engaging those cul
tures on their own terms, and immersing themselves in
their language and customs. We acknowledge that engage
ment with foreign culture, at its best, will teach our stu
dents not only about cultural differences but human
similarities. The engagement will clarify and confirm for
students who they are and what they believe as well as how
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different they might be from the culture that they are engag
ing. Yet we seem to have great difficulty in transferring this
same laudable educational intent to cultural differences
within our own society, whether based on ethnic identity,
gender identity, or sexual identity.

•

Western civilization at its root
has always embraced diversity as an essential
condition of the search for truth.
It would be easy to conclude that foreign cultures are
easier to accept across an ocean than they are in our own
backyard. But this truism obscures another changing real
ity of our times: what is foreign and what is domestic is no
longer so clearly separable. “American cars" are substan
tially made in Japan and 'Japanese cars" are entirely made
in America. What happens in Japan directly affects the
welfare of Americans. The world is smaller and more in
terdependent even as our sense of difference increases. Yet
we fail to recognize this in the way we approach issues of
international and cultural diversity in higher education. We
almost always put international studies in one place and
women's and ethnic studies in another place while ignoring
the deep, common intercultural themes that cut across all of
them. We fail to explore how our understanding of foreign
cultures might help us to understand the alien subcultures
in our own country.

Convergence of Tradition and Change
There are other areas in higher education where common
themes have been obscured by the clash of polarized opin
ion. Too much of the intellectual discussion about multicul
tural issues has been dominated by two groups: those on
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the left who believe that tradition is unremittingly hostile to
multicultural inclusion and therefore needs to be under
mined, and those on the right who believe that the fortress
of Western civilization can only be defended by denying
entry to any new thinking having to do with women,
ethnic, or non-Western studies. Because so much of the
debate has been framed by the artificial and misleading
issues of "political correctness" on the one hand and the
"erosion of Western cultural values" on the other hand, the
impression has been created that cultural diversity is some
how in conflict with the core values of Western civilization.

Those in the cultural majority, by and large,
have had the freedom voluntarily
to engage or integrate with the minority
cultures as it suited them in accordance
with their ideals, their prejudices,
or their circumstances.

In fact, the opposite is true. We cherish intellectual
diversity in higher education because, as Bruce Kimball has
pointed out, the Socratic approach to truth is one of the two
major streams of our liberal arts tradition. It is the founda
tion of our modern academic culture. We believe that if
different points of view are expressed and if these points of
view critically engage each other, then a more refined view
of the truth will emerge. Intellectual diversity is essential to
the pursuit of truth. It is precisely for these traditional rea
sons that we should welcome rather than disdain the new
thinking embodied in women's studies, ethnic studies, and
non-Western studies.
When we see cultural diversity as an aspect of intellec
tual diversity, the artificial battle lines between multicul
turalism and Western civilization disappear. The hiring of

Diversity and Our Discontents

29

women and minorities on our faculties can be viewed as
enriching the variety of intellectual perspectives in our
academic dialogue rather than as requirements to fill
quotas. This is not to say that someone of a different race or
gender will always have a different intellectual perspective.
It is to say that the "outsider's" view is often a fresh and
more incisive one. Being French enabled de Tocqueville to
see American strengths and weaknesses more clearly, and
being a woman enabled Carol Gilligan to see the strengths
and weaknesses of male-centered theories of moral de
velopment more clearly. Intellectual diversity is a paradig
matic value for Western civilization and for our modern
university, and cultural diversity is a present manifestation
of it.

Convergence of Difference Through Common Discourse
How then should we conceptualize cultural diversity to
allay rather than increase our discontents? The issue was
well described by Neil Rudenstine at his inauguration as
Harvard's 26th president: "The problem of how individuals
and groups establish and assert their own identity without
being tempted to repudiate or diminish the identity of
others, is one of the deep riddles of our time. It perplexes
our world and even now threatens to break apart nations of
peoples. . . "3 The British director Peter Brook described the
same problem differently in discussing his production of
the Indian classic. The Mahabharata. "We are used to think
ing about culture," he said, "as something that is single,
absolute, and clearly separate from other cultures. We
assume there is only one, universal culture.'"*
But that customary way of thinking about culture does
not adequately engage the conditions of our time. The con
temporary experience is the reality of cultures and subcul
tures in continuous engagement and frequent collision with
each other. We in higher education need to help form the
dialogue between cultures, not as adversarial pitched bat
tles where winning is more important than understanding,
but as a Socratic search for truth that emerges from the
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encounter with different points of view. This confirms the
essential values in Western civilization. Even more impor
tant it confirms the American immigrant experience, which
is the paradigmatic human experience of the 21st century.
For immigrants, like minorities, are always encountering a
different culture, always struggling to affirm their human
identity and dignity in a context that involves more than one
culture. This vision of a pluralistic, immigrant American
culture, which has always been made up of more than one,
needs to inform and infuse our discussions of multicul
turalism. As an American version of Western civilization, it
is not so much a fortress to be defended as a set of bridges to
be extended. And it is in our common crossing of those
bridges that we may find our discontents diminished rather
than increased, and where we might hope that George Bush
overcomes the Japanese flu and Clarence Thomas no longer
rages at racism.

Because so much of the debate has been framed
by the artificial and misleading issues of
"political correctness"
on the one hand and the
"erosion of Western cultural values"
on the other hand,
the impression has been created
that cultural diversity is somehow in conflict
with the core values of Western civilization.

Ultimately, the answer to all of the riddles that we
raised are one and the same. We fail to see the deeper
similarities that lie below our more obvious differences. We
do not dig into the common ground from which our differ-
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ent conceptions emerge. When we can see that George Bush
and Clarence Thomas have discontent for the same reason,
we realize that they are in their own ways experiencing the
same condition, however different the surface forms it may
take. Engaging and learning from foreign cultures abroad is
no different from engaging and learning from different

•

Why are we so comfortable
learning from other cultures abroad
and so uncomfortable about
learning from different cultures
in our own country?
•
subcultures in our own country. But we fail to see this
because we compartmentalize and separate foreign from
domestic affairs, when in fact the international experience
is now, in a fundamental sense, the domestic experience as
well. Western civilization at its root has always embraced
diversity as an essential condition of the search for truth,
and the misleading notion that new ways of looking at old
issues undermine Western civilization comes from the fail
ure to see that intellectual diversity is the paradigm for
multicultural diversity. And finally, by understanding the
American expression of Western civilization as an essen
tially immigrant nation, we can see more clearly that cul
tural diversity, far from threatening our character and tradi
tions, affirms them in ways that can help to dissolve our
self-inflicted discontents.

Notes
1. Troy Duster, workshop on diversity sponsored by the Western
Association of Schools and Colleges, San Francisco, August 13-15,
1991.
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2. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
3. Neil Rudenstine, "Agenda for the Nineties," Harvard Maga
zine, January-February 1992, p. 48.

4. Peter Brook, interview on Public Broadcasting System follow
ing his production of The Mahabharata, April 14, 1991.
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Frank E Wong is vice president for academic affairs at the
University of Redlands. Wong, a leading thinker and
activist in American higher education, is particularly com
mitted to shaping education to respond to a multicultural
world. He has served as a consultant to numerous confer
ences and committees and has written a number of articles
including the recent "Diversity and Community: Right
Objectives, Wrong Arguments," Change, July-August 1991.

Conceptions of Civic Responsibility
and the Role of
Education in a Multicultural World
Herbert C. Kelman
Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics
Harvard University
•
Alfred Bloom's doctoral adviser, it is a special pleasure
xx for me to participate in the ceremony for his inaugura
tion as president of Swarthmore College. I know that he has
come back to an institution that he loves, and I have not the
slightest doubt that he will use his unique combination of
scholarship and humanism to serve, both at Swarthmore
and in the wider community, the values to which he has
always been dedicated.
A good indication of this commitment is his inaugural
address and the very topic to which this inaugural program
is devoted. For the present panel, we were asked to address
the question: How can colleges help educate students for
civic responsibility in a multicultural world? I will begin by
exploring the meaning of civic responsibility and then
briefly comment on (i) the implications of my view of civic
responsibility for a multicultural society and world and
(2) the ways in which a college education might contribute
to the development of this kind of civic responsibility.
I approach civic responsibility from a conceptual per
spective that distinguishes three types of political orienta
tions (or orientations to the political system), each of which
represents a different view of the citizen role and the re
sponsibilities attendant to it: rule orientation, role orienta
tion, and value orientation.
The distinctions among the orientations can be cast,
first, in terms of their views of the implicit contract that
defines the reciprocal relationship between citizen and gov
ernment: what the citizen has a right to expect from the
33
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government and what the government has a right to expect
from the citizen in return. Both these sets of expectations
tend to be minimal for rule-oriented citizens. They see it as
their task to follow the rules: to respect authorities' de
mands, do what is required of them, and stay out of
trouble. In return, they expect the government to uphold
the rules, and thus protect their basic interests and assure
societal order. They support policies that contribute to their
sense of security within the rules.
Role-oriented citizens, who identify with the nation
and are involved in their roles within it, have a higher set of
expectations. They want to be, and to perceive themselves
as, good citizens who meet their role obligations by actively
supporting the government and faithfully obeying its de
mands. In return, they expect the government to uphold the
integrity of their roles by ensuring high status for the na
tion, from which they derive vicarious satisfaction and rela
tively high personal status for themselves. They support
policies that contribute to enhancing their sense of status
within their roles as national citizens and their other roles in
the society.
Value-oriented citizens are committed to the govern
ment because they share the cultural and institutional
values on which they believe the state to be founded. They
see it as their citizen obligation to take an active part in
formulating, evaluating, and questioning national policies.
Their view of the citizen role requires them to support
policies that are in keeping with what they see as the soci
ety's fundamental values, but to oppose policies that violate
these values—even to the point of civil disobedience. They
expect the government to pursue policies that uphold and
reflect these fundamental values.
These different sets of expectations imply different
patterns of participation in carrying out the duties of citi
zenship. Participation by the rule-oriented tends to be pas
sive: They generally comply to the degree necessary to
protect their interests, to assure access to the resources to
which their citizenship entitles them and avoid penalties for
breaking the rules. Participation by the role-oriented tends
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to be far more actively supportive: They identify with the
state and are emotionally and instrumentally involved in
their societal roles. They are, therefore, concerned with
meeting their citizen obligations by giving substantive
support to national policies, taking an active part in carry
ing out such policies, and conducting the everyday business
of the society. Finally, value-oriented citizens conceive of
their citizenship duties as requiring active participation not
only in carrying out national policies, but in formulating
and evaluating such policies.

The obligations of the good citizen
include an obligation not only
to take an active part in carrying out policies,
but in formulating, evaluating,
and questioning policies, and—
when necessary—
in refusing to go along with them.

The three orientations lead to divergent views of the
role and meaning of morality in the political sphere. For the
rule-oriented, standard moral principles are largely irrele
vant both to the actions of the citizen in an authority context
and to the actions of the state in pursuit of its primary
purposes: assuring public order and national security.
Rule-oriented citizens do look at their relationship to au
thorities in moral terms, in the sense that they view that
relationship as a contract whereby the citizens follow the
rules and do what they are told, and in return the authorities
accept full responsibility for the consequences of the actions
they ordered. When rule-oriented citizens believe that the
authorities are violating the contract, they feel betrayed and
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morally indignant? They are much less likely, however, to
apply moral criteria to the content and consequences of
action by citizens or state. This view tends to have a cynical
overtone. The state cannot afford the luxury of concerning
itself with higher principles, and individuals can only be
expected to do what they must in order to stay out of
trouble.

In a multicultural world,
equal access to education
throughout all segments of the society
(and indeed the world)
is essential to the empowerment
of those groups (and societies)
that have been victims of historical
discrimination and systematic exclusion.

For the role-oriented, special moral principles apply to
the citizen in relation to the state as well as to the state itself.
The morality of obedience—the obligation to obey and sup
port the government—at the level of the individual citizen,
and the duty to pursue the national interest at the level of the
state, both override standard moral considerations. In this
view, moral considerations go beyond the pure exchange
relationship of the rule-oriented, since the behavior of the
citizens as well as the behavior of the state are governed by a
set of obligations or duties. Yet, role orientation is similar to
rule orientation in that the content and consequences of
action by citizens and state are not subjected to the kinds
of moral criteria that are generally applied to personal
relations.
Finally, for the value-oriented, principles of personal
morality continue to govern the behavior of individuals as
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citizens, and adherence to moral principles is fundamental
to the legitimacy of state action. Actions by and on behalf of
the state may not always conform precisely to the expecta
tions that govern personal relations, but they have to be
chosen and evaluated with reference to standard moral
principles. Value orientation implies that, even in the citi
zen role, individuals are mindful of the specific content of
the actions they are taking (or ordered to take) and assess
the human consequences of these actions before deciding
to proceed. There are similar criteria in assessing state
actions.
Under normal circumstances, we do not expect sys
tematic differences among orientations in readiness to sup
port the government and adhere to its authoritative de
mands. Rule-oriented, role-oriented, and value-oriented
citizens all typically accept the legitimacy of the political
system. Thus, when a legitimate authority issues an explicit
and seemingly appropriate order, all three types of citizens
are inclined to obey—for their own reasons and in their own
fashion. They are likely, however, to differ in the quality of
their support of government policies. Rule-oriented citizens
can be expected to provide the most automatic support, but
it tends to be of a compliant sort: They do what is necessary
and no more. The role-oriented provide the most reliable
and enthusiastic support, reflecting their identification
with the state and the citizen role. The value-oriented are
likely to provide the greatest long-run support to a society
that adheres to its principles. But their support in any given
case is conditional since they tend to make their own judg
ments of the appropriateness of official policy.
These differences in the quality of support translate
into differences in the ability and readiness, under excep
tional circumstances, to challenge authority's definition of
what must be done. When an apparently legitimate author
ity orders actions that the individual would normally con
sider morally unacceptable, the ensuing conflict is resolved
differently for each political orientation. Value-oriented in
dividuals can more readily break out of the authority's
definition of the situation, since they see the citizen role as
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including an obligation to evaluate and to question. They
are also more likely to have the cognitive skills, motiva
tional inclinations, and material resources needed to chal
lenge authority. In contrast, both rule- and role-oriented
individuals are less likely to challenge authority under the
circumstances.
Responsibility in an authority situation therefore takes
on different nuances for each of the three orientations. In the
view of the rule-oriented individual, the authority
subordinate contract calls for compliance by the subordi
nate with authoritative demands: adherence to the rules and
regulations in the interest of staying out of trouble. This
view of responsibility focuses on sanctions for breaking
rules. For the role-oriented individual, the contract with
authority involves the subordinate's identity; responsibility
focuses on fulfilling role obligations as part of living up to this
identity. For the value-oriented individual, responsibility is
a matter of independent judgment, self-direction based on
internalized standards. These standards apply whether the
value-oriented citizen is acting under authority or, as may
often be the case, as the authority. These three views of
responsibility can also be coordinated with differences in
the tense on which the individual focuses. In rule orienta
tion, responsibility primarily means a concern with past
performances with the possibility of being blamed and
penalized for following that of expectations. In role orienta
tion, the focus is on the present: Responsibility means a
concern that current performance is reliable and meets the
expectations of one's role. In value orientation, responsibil
ity implies foresight: a concern with the future conse
quences of action.
The three types of political orientation, as they impact
on civic responsibility, can be evaluated in terms of one's
particular approach to moral justification. My own ap
proach can be described as a variant of rule consequentialism, whose assumptions can be summarized as follows:
1. The ultimate criterion for mored evaluation of an
action, policy or institution is its effect on human welfare,
broadly conceived: the satisfaction of human needs (includ
ing the entire range, from survival needs to self-
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actualization) and the fulfillment of human potentialities.
Since satisfaction of needs and fulfillment of potentialities
depend on the societal and institutional context, moral
evaluation must always consider the impact of actions or
policies on the societal conditions they are creating and on
the identity of groups through which individuals often
fulfill their needs and potentialities.
2. The acceptance or violation of certain moral princi
ples (such as autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, jus
tice, truth-telling) has consequences for the satisfaction of
needs and fulfillment of potentialities. Maintaining the in
tegrity of these principles is therefore itself a condition for
human welfare and a criterion for moral evaluation. Respect
for human dignity is a central principle to which all others
can be linked.
3. Human dignity implies equal worth of individuals
and hence equal treatment across biological, cultural, and
social categories. In assessing the human consequences of
action, it is therefore necessary to adopt a universal perspec
tive that considers all those who also may be affected by the
action, regardless of the categories to which they may
belong.
4. This view of moral decision-making clearly re
quires consideration of a wide range of human conse
quences, in addition to the immediate consequences for
particular individuals affected by the action. Thus, it is
necessary to consider the diffuse, systematic consequences
of actions or policies, such as the consequences for societal
values, and social conditions, for institutional structures
and group rights, and for the integrity of moral principles
themselves—all of which have an impact on justification of
needs and fulfillment of potentialities. Furthermore, it is
necessary to consider the long-term consequences of
actions and policies, including their effects on future
generations. Finally, moral decision-making requires
attentiveness to the unintended consequences—the harm
ful side effects—of well-intentioned actions.
When the three types of political orientation are as
sessed in terms of this framework for moral justification, it
seems evident that value orientation comes closest to meet-
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ing the criteria for responsible decision-making that it
specifies. In this sense, it can be said that the highest form of
civic responsibility implies value orientation. That is,
value-oriented citizens are most likely to evaluate their own
actions within the citizen role and policies of the state in
terms of their systematic, long-range, and unintended con
sequences for human welfare, viewed in a universal per
spective, and for the integrity of the moral principles
(epitomized by respect for human dignity) that is itself a
condition for human welfare. Responsible citizenship of
this type presupposes value orientation: an expanded view
of the obligations of the good citizen, which includes an
obligation not only to take an active part in carrying out
policies, but in formulating, evaluating, and questioning
policies, and—when necessary—in refusing to go along
with them; and a readiness to bring autonomous judgment
to bear on the policy process, assessing the entire range of
policy consequences from an independent standpoint
rooted in personal values. It should be noted, however, that
such personal values are almost invariably shared within a
collectivity; it is the shared character of the values that gives
an individual the sense of obligation, the standing, and the
courage to act on them.
Value orientation does not entirely replace rule and role
orientation. Value-oriented citizens generally accept re
sponsibility for following the rules and take seriously the
obligation of the citizen role to support and obey legitimate
authorities. They abide by the laws, they pay taxes, they
vote—they willingly do what is required to maintain social
order and to contribute to the effective and equitable func
tioning of the society. But they assess the rules and role
obligations themselves from the perspective of the values
that they are intended to promote. Thus, value-oriented
citizens bring independent judgment to bear on the rules
and role obligations that the political system and its au
thorities define for them, using their personal values (gen
erally shared, as indicated above, with one or more groups)
as criteria. In this sense, responsible citizenship of the
highest order, as defined here, implies an ability to with-
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Stand the effects of rule and role orientation in binding
individuals to authorities' definition of the situation. En
abling individuals to better withstand these binding effects
is one of the functions of college education, as I shall argue
in my concluding remarks. In short, the distinguishing
characteristic of value-oriented citizenship is that, ulti
mately, individuals accept personal responsibility for their
own actions in a collective context, and for the actions that
the state or other collectivity takes in their names.

The basic moral unit is, of course,
the individual, and hence the ultimate criteria
are the welfare and the fulfillment
of the potentialities of individuals,
but we must keep in mind how these are
linked—by social as well as personal forces—
to the standing and treatment of the group.

Value orientation has two components, which corre
spond very closely to the two dimensions of moral reason
ing that Alfred Bloom distinguished in his doctoral research
and tested cross-culturally: social principledness and social
humanism.’ Social principledness refers to moral au
tonomy in making sociopolitical decisions and in reacting
to demands from authorities—a readiness to act on the basis
of a set of individually derived general principles, rather
than accept without question the dictates of authority and
social convention. Social humanism refers to a readiness to
grant priority to the human implications of sociopolitical
decisions—to the consequences of the actions we choose for
the concrete human beings that are affected by them. Alfred
Bloom's research showed that these two dimensions are
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independent, but that they tend to come together at the high
ends of each dimension. The concept of citizen responsibil
ity that characterizes value orientation, as I have described
it, combines these two aspects of moral reasoning. For
value-oriented individuals, responsibility implies inde
pendent judgment: They use internalized standards to
evaluate the consequences of actions and policies. And the
ultimate criteria for this evaluation are the human conse
quences: the effect of the action or policy on the satisfaction
of basic human needs and the fulfillment of human poten
tialities, both in the short run and in the long run.

For the rule-oriented, standard moral
principles are largely irrelevant both to
the actions of the citizen in an authority context
and to the actions of the state
in pursuit of its primary purposes:
assuring public order and nation^ security.

There is an underlying tension between social princip
ledness and social humanism. Social principledness implies
a stance of impartiality in the application of universal prin
ciples in specific situations. But the moment we consider the
specific context of an action in terms of its consequences for
the concrete human beings that are affected by them, we
cannot ignore the requirements and characteristics of the
particular individuals involved, or the particular relation
ship that we have to these individuals. A high level of
humanism makes us especially sensitive, for example, to
the suffering that we observe on a daily basis within our
immediate community or to the obligations that derive from
bonds of kinship or friendship with particular individuals.
Moreover, it makes us especially attentive to the needs of
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groups that have been subjected to historical discrimina
tion and exclusion. Moral decision-making—according to
the terms of my framework or virtually any other
framework for moral justification—must be based on uni
versal principles and consider the consequences of action
for the human community as a whole. Yet the application of
universal moral principles must be tempered by the re
quirements of particular individuals, groups, and relation
ships. The resulting tension between what has been called
“impartiality and particularity"'* is thus inevitable in moral
decision-making: Rather than assigning priority of one over
the other, we must find ways of balancing them in each
individual case.
The tension between impartiality and particularity is
reflected in my answer to the first of the two questions to
which I promised to address myself briefly at the beginning
of my remarks: What are the implications of the view of civic
responsibility presented here for a multicultural society and
world? I shall mention three such implications:
1. A value-oriented approach to civic responsibility,
with its emphasis on the human consequences of action and
policy, must of necessity take a universal perspective in the
assessment of consequences. It differs in this regard from
rule- and role-oriented approaches, both of which take as
their point of departure the relationship of citizens to the
authorities within their own communities: Civic responsi
bility is defined as adherence to the citizen's contract with
the authorities or reliable fulfiliment of one's citizen obliga
tions. The overarching frame of reference in rule- and role
orientation is formed by the interests, the welfare, or the
achievements of the community to which the citizen be
longs, rather than the wider community that is affected by
the action or policy.
A value-oriented approach, as I conceive it, starts with
the assumption of the universality of basic human needs
(though not necessarily of the ways in which these needs
are satisfied) and of the equal worth of all individuals. A
clear implication of these assumptions is a concern with
human welfare and a commitment to equal treatment across
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biological, cultural, and social categories. Thus, civic re
sponsibility in a multicultural world requires active con
sideration of the consequences of action and policy not only
for our own nation, but for all nations and for the global
society in which each segment depends on all others for
peace, security, economic well-being, health, protection of
the environment, and human rights. Similarly, civic re
sponsibility in a multicultural society requires active con
sideration of the consequences of action and policy not only
for the dominant ethnic/cultural group, but for all of the
communities that make up the society.
2. The satisfaction of basic human needs and the
fulfillment of human potentialities take place in a social
context, a central part of which are the cultural communities
and the identity groups to which individuals belong. The
welfare of these groups has double significance to its mem
bers: The way in which their groups are treated affects both
their personal interests and their psychological well-being,
since the fate of individuals is tied to, and their personal
identity is invested in, the groups (particularly the ethnic/
cultural units) to which they belong. Thus, civic responsi
bility requires active consideration of the consequences of
action and policy for the cultural communities in terms of
which individuals define themselves and are defined by the
larger society. The basic moral unit (both as actor and as
target of action) is, of course, the individual, and hence the
ultimate criteria are the welfare and the fulfillment of the
potentialities of individuals, but we must keep in mind how
these are linked—by social as well as personal forces—to
the standing and treatment of the group.
Consideration of the needs and rights of cultural com
munities may come into conflict with the principle of uni
versality, thus manifesting the general tension in moral
decision-making between impartiality and particularity.
For example, to counteract the effects of a history of dis
crimination and exclusion of an ethnic group, it may be
necessary to depart from a strict application of the rule of
equal treatment of all groups, as is done in affirmative
action programs. While particularistic policies or practices

The Role of Education in a Multicultural World

45

of this sort are inevitably in tension with the impartial
application of universal principles, they do represent a
readiness to transcend the perspective of the dominant
groups in the society. Rule- and role-oriented citizenship,
by contrast, tend to be bound by the perspective of the
authorities and the dominant sectors. What is perceived as
impartial within that perspective may in fact represent a
perpetuation of the advantage of the particular groups that
have defined the rules and benefited from them in the past.
3. Our view of the value-oriented citizen is very simi
lar to what Michael Walzer describes as the pluralist citi
zen. 5 For pluralist citizens, the state is the largest or most
inclusive group to which they have obligations, but it is not
the only group. They have "other responsibilities, for,"
Walzer argues, "there is no way to be a responsible citizen
except to have more than one responsibility."^ Other groups
to which citizens belong provide the individual an inde
pendent set of criteria by which to evaluate the demands of
the state. In this sense then, membership in other
groups—including religious organizations, labor unions,
political parties, as well as ethnic/cultural communities—is
in fact a condition for responsible exercise of the citizen role.
The presumption is that the individual is committed to the
larger society, but has an independent basis, i.e., the values
shared with a subgroup within the society for evaluating,
potentially challenging and ultimately shaping national
policies and actions. By contrast, rule- and role-oriented
citizens tend to be caught up in the perspective of the state
authorities.
In principle, the individual's personal value system
can provide the independent basis for evaluating and chal
lenging the policies and demands of the state. In practice,
however, such an independent stance almost invariably
occurs in the context of a group that serves as a source of
alternative values, that justifies and legitimates the indi
vidual's stance, that mobilizes and obligates the individual
to take action, and that provides the moral and material
support that enables the individual to confront the state
authority. The role of the group is particularly significant
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when independent evaluation leads to disobedience.
Walzer argues that "disobedience, when it is not criminally
but morally, religiously, or politically motivated, is almost
always a collective act, and it is justified by the values of the
collectivity and the mutual engagements of its members."'^

Let me finally offer some brief comments on the second
question I raised at the beginning: How can a college educa
tion contribute to the kind of civic responsibility that I have
described? What clearly follows from my scheme is that we
should think about ways in which higher education can
foster value orientation with its emphasis on independent
judgment in terms of the human consequences of state
policy and action. Education can also contribute, however,
to enabling individuals to withstand the binding effects of
rule and role orientation, a point to which I have already
alluded. I do not have in mind here a weakening of com
mitment to the rules and role obligations that are much of
the stuff of civic responsibility, but a strengthening of indi
viduals' ability to evaluate and question authorities' defini
tion of what these rules and role obligations are. Thus, I will
conclude with another set of three very general points about
the potential contributions of education to the development
of responsible citizenship in a multicultural world. These
three contributions can be described as empowerment,
multiple perspectives, and broad empathy.
1. Education can help counteract the binding effects
of rule orientation by contributing to the empowerment of
individuals. Education itself is empowering because it
enhances individuals' expectations and opportunities to
occupy positions in society that involve greater levels of
authority and decision-making power. Moreover, it pro
vides the knowledge and skills that enhance the sense of
efficacy so essential to the readiness to evaluate authority
demands. In a multicultural world, equal access to educa
tion throughout all segments of the society (and indeed the
world) is essential to the empowerment of those groups
(and societies) that have been victims of historical discrimi
nation and systematic exclusion. Equal access, of course.
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means not only including all those who are qualified, but
counteracting those forces that have historically inhibited
qualification. Apart from increasing access, it is important
to develop patterns of civic education that are deliberately
geared to empowering individuals. There are models for
empowering education, such as Paulo Freire's pedagogy
of the oppressed,® that might be adapted for college
constituencies.

Role-oriented citizens . . . expect the
government to uphold the integrity
of their roles by ensuring high status
for the nation, from which they derive
vicarious satisfaction and relatively
high personal status for themselves.

2. Education can help counteract the binding .effects
of role orientation by systematically exposing students to
multiple perspectives, thus underlining the concept that
there are a variety of perspectives—apart from those of
fered by authority and convention—from which political
issues and arrangements can be viewed, and familiarizing
the students with a range of such perspectives. Exposure to
the idea and content of multiple perspectives contributes
both to the habit of and the means for subjecting official
policies and actions to independent evaluation. To this end,
it is important to include competence in making judgments
and developing criteria (including ethical criteria) for mak
ing such judgments as a central feature of the educational
process. Furthermore, it is essential to assign a central role
to the development of a global perspective, which can pro
vide a corrective to the nationalist or ethnocentric approach
within which public issues are so often framed.
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3. Finally, college education can contribute to value
orientation both by fostering independent judgment
through the content and methods of instruction (which is,
of course, what a liberal arts education is all about), and by
increasing students' awareness of the human consequences
of public action. It is particularly important to focus atten
tion on the systemic, long-term, and unintended conse
quences of national policies. To develop an awareness of
human consequences for a universal perspective, college
can provide training in broad empathy, which implies inclu
sion of all human groups throughout the world in our moral
community, trying to understand their situation as they
themselves experience it, and being actively concerned with
the satisfaction of their needs and fulfillment of their poten
tialities. In this spirit, education in our multicultural world
can heighten awareness of the diversity of social patterns
and institutions that different cultures have developed in
order to address universal needs. Moreover, by exposing
students—in a sympathetic but nonetheless realistic
way—to the broad range of cultures in our society and our
world, colleges can contribute to the humanization of all
parts of the human family, encouraging students to respect
the projects and care for the welfare of all human groups and
communities.
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Some Dilemmas
of Multicultural Education
Nel Noddings
Professor and Associate Dean, School of Education
Stanford University

ost educators and students today agree that education
should prepare participants for civic responsibility
in a multicultural world. We agree that students should
have some knowledge and appreciation of cultures other
than their own. But beyond a vague agreement at that
dangerously restrictive level, we argue—sometimes with
intemperate language—over the goals of "multicultural
education." In this short talk, I want to identify and explore
several components of the current controversy. I'll confine
my remarks to problems of domestic multiculturalism—
that is, to issues that arise with respect to so-called hyphe
nated Americans: African Americans, Chinese Americans,
etc.
A question often arises as to just how ethnocentric a
multicultural curriculum should be. In what sense is a cur
riculum composed of African studies, Chinese studies, and
others a multicultural curriculum? People who ask this
question are concerned with the contribution such courses
make to the whole student body. Accustomed to thinking of
college and university students as a homogeneous cultural
group, they assume that general courses—courses not
aimed at subject matter specialists—should, potentially at
least, contribute to the general education of all students. If
such courses are potentially important for all students, it is
clear that their most significant material must be incorpo
rated into the mainstream curriculum, because no student
can possibly take all the individual courses that might be
developed. Now we are already facing one of our biggest
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dilemmas; I'll call it the dilemma of "generous assimila
tion," and I'll come back to it shortly.
But let's back up for a moment. One value embedded
in multicultural education is surely the one we started
with—that is, acquiring some knowledge and appreciation
of other cultures. But that is by no means the only one.
Lawrence Blum lists first, "affirming one's own cultural
identity; learning about and valuing one's own cultural
heritage"; second, the goal with which we started, and,
third, valuing and taking delight in cultural diversity it
self. If we accept Blum's first value—affirming one's own
cultural identity—then we see that courses concentrating on
particular ethnic cultures may be essential. They are in
cluded in the curriculum not because they contribute to all
students' knowledge and appreciation (although they cer
tainly may do this) but because they satisfy another pur
pose of multicultural education: providing particular
groups of students with recognized opportunities to learn
about and value their own cultural heritage. Students of
other ethnicities should certainly be welcomed in such
courses, but the courses are not offered primarily for their
benefit.
Critics argue, however, that African Americans and
Chinese Americans are, after all, Americans and, as such,
participants in the Western culture that underlies and sup
ports the form of government and cultural institutions that
make America. From this perspective, African Americans
should affirm their cultural identities first as Americans
and then, like all other Americans, acquire a knowledge
and appreciation of African culture as an "other" culture.
At one level, this attitude is grossly insensitive; at another,
it presents a dilemma that can perhaps be resolved.
The insensitive extreme is illustrated in a statement by
Arthur Schlesinger. He writes:
One senses a certain inauthenticity in saddling public
schools with the mission of convincing children of the

beauties of their particular ethnic origins. The ethnic
subcultures, if they had genuine vitality, would be
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sufficiently instilled in children by family, church and
community. It is surely not the office of the public school to
promote artificial ethnic chauvinism.^

Now, this seems to me not only grossly insensitive but
illogical as well. We might as well argue that the schools
need not teach Western culture either because, since it
clearly has "genuine vitality," it is sufficiently promulgated
by family, church, and community. Schlesinger would ar
gue, of course, that all facets of "objective" history should
be incorporated in the curriculum, including black history,
etc., but that the purpose of such inclusion is to provide all
students with as nearly an unbiased account of history and
cultural achievement as possible. He accepts the second
goal of multicultural education identified by Blum but not
the first.
Accepting the need for groups to affirm their own
cultural identity, we might adopt a pluralism of co
existence, a position William James summed up as "hands
off."’ Taking a similar position, Maria Lugones and
Elizabeth Spelman warn majority members not to enter
minority worlds "out of obligation. If they can enter out of
love, majority members should be welcome in minority
circles; but they should not enter out of obligation. Rather,
they write:
Out of obligation you should stay out of our way, respect us
and our distance, and forego the use of whatever power you
have over us—for example, the power to use your language
in our meetings, the power to overwhelm us with your

education, the power to intrude in our communities in
order to research us and to record the supposed dying
of our cultures, the power to engrain in us a sense that
we are members of a dying culture and are doomed to

assimilate ... *

The rejection of assimilation raises a genuine dilemma
for those of us who would prefer a pluralism of cooperation.
One of my own adopted sons expressed his disappointment
and depression when he returned from a visit to the land of
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his birth, Korea. He said, “When I am in America, I feel like
a Korean, and when I am in Korea, I feel like an American."
This was said with the softness and infinite sadness of the
perpetual stranger. It is not enough for such young people
to study American culture or Korean culture. They need a
place to study and create their special identities as Korean
Americans. The dual identities must somehow be made
one, and that is not accomplished by becoming wholly
"American."
On one level, however, I agree with Schlesinger that
ethnic Americans, as well as mainstream Americans, need
to think more deeply on this dilemma. I think he is right to
point out that parts of African history may be irrelevant to
African Americans because they fail to represent their
actual cultural heritage. Just as surely, much of Chinese
history is not part of the meaningful heritage of Chinese
Americans, and most of Korean history fails to capture or
enhance the experience of my sons. Schlesinger is primarily
concerned with authentic history, getting the facts right,
but I am concerned with setting the right task. To me, that
task is helping all of our students to create a whole identity
out of parts that sometimes contradict each other and to do
this in a way that does not require total rejection of either
part. I do think that some ethnic curricula today are paying
too little attention to this task. They are carried away by the
heady possibilities of creating an identity that, in fact, bears
little resemblance to either the ethnic or the American. Both
are essential for individual integrity, and the latter is essen
tial for national integrity.
I said earlier that I would return to the dilemma of
"generous assimilation." Many well-meaning educators
take the position that ethnic studies are so important that
they should be integrated into the regular curriculum. Such
integration, they argue, is the only way to give diverse
cultures the recognition they deserve. The position is
generous because it is well-intended and inclusionary. But
assimilation, however generous, presents obvious dangers.
I'll use women's studies as an example here. Some of
my courses at Stanford are cross-listed in Feminist Studies.
I certainly welcome the inclusion of many topics from these
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courses in the standard curriculum, but I would not like to
see the Feminist Studies Program absorbed by or assimi
lated to the standard curriculum. Why not? I have already
discussed one reason: These courses are not offered solely
for the benefit of the general student. They meet a special
need of women. Another reason arises from a more-or-less
familiar academic objection: If a discipline is absorbed by
another or made into a mere component of something
larger, there is a loss of depth and detail. This could be
avoided, of course, by maintaining Women's Studies as a
separate scholarly discipline for specialists. This solution
might be widely accepted by academics.
But there is another argument against assimilation.
Feminist studies, like African American studies or Native
American studies, is fundamentally opposed to much that
the standard curriculum represents. All of these ethno- and
gender-centered studies are challenging the ideas of hierar
chy, canon, compulsory subjects, isolated disciplines, cre
dentials, and a host of pedagogical practices. We may
change our minds about some of the ideas we now oppose;
we may compromise or even some day admit that we were
mistaken in some of the positions we now take. But right
now, we are filled with nonviolent revolutionary zeal, and
we need time to experiment, to try our hand at tasks we
have never before had the power to undertake. So, we cry,
don't assimilate us! And sometimes—inevitably, I think,
given our history—our cry comes out, "Don't assimilate us.
We don't want to be like you!"
So we are faced with another dilemma. Do women,
African Americans, and Native Americans want to be like
successful white males or don't we-they? Here I had
difficulty deciding whether to write "we" or "they." As a
woman, I fully understand the resistance to becoming "like
them." As an associate dean (a member of another peculiar
culture), I often experience frustration with minority
groups who see me as a symbol of something repugnant,
who seem perpetually dissatisfied. The temptation when
I'm feeling such frustration is to say, "Do you want a Ph.D.
or don't you? Here's the way it is. Make up your mind!" But,
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of course, what we-they want is to create a new image, a
new identity; in struggling with this formidable task, we
sometimes go too far, and sometimes we do not go far
enough. Worse, even after the case we often do not know
how to judge when we've done one, when the other.

As we extend ourselves empathetically
to others, we recognize them not only
as generic individuals and holders of rights,
but as concrete individuals, and concrete
individuals have multiple identities.
In caring relations with concrete others,
we develop an appreciation for other cultures.

Part of our task as educators is exactly this: to develop
criteria by which our own behavior should be judged.
Consider a hypothetical case: Suppose a feminist studies
professor excludes a male student from her class because he
does not accept a basic premise of the course, namely that
all problems will be studied from a woman-centered per
spective. Is this ideological exclusion? If it is, is this bad?
Many feminists argue today that all or most forms of exclu
sion are ideological, so what's the big deal? If "they" can do
it, the argument runs, so can "we." And what should be
done with me as a feminist-academic if I object to this line of
defense and, more generally, to any ideological exclusion?
Have I then accepted my identity as an academic and forsa
ken my identity as a feminist? These are hard questions
emanating from a genuine dilemma.
One line of proposed solution to the dilemmas I have
identified is to look for an identity beyond the hyphenated
ones I've been discussing. We might say something like
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this: Look, of course I am a feminist and an academic. I'm
also white, middle class, professional, agnostic, indepen
dent in my politics, a philosopher, a former math teacher, a
mother, and so on. Beyond all these I am a human being,
and surely there are criteria by which I can judge my behav
ior as a fully moral and rational human being. To a certain
degree, I believe this. Indeed, I believe that when we accept
all three goals that Blum has identified for multicultural
education—affirming our own culture, acquiring knowl
edge of other cultures, and appreciating diversity for its
own sake—we come closer to being more fully human. I
would like to judge my own behavior on criteria that are
consonant with these goals and that go beyond to include
criteria such as these: Have I responded adequately to the
pain expressed by those who address me? Have I made an
attempt to include the views and needs of those who have a
stake in the matter at hand? Are the relations of which I am a
part strengthened or weakened by my behavior? If they are
weakened (by, say, an apparent lack of loyalty on my part),
is it my intention to make them somehow better, to persist,
that is, not in justifying myself but in working things
through to a set of relations more satisfactory and satisfying
to all involved?
Alas, as I list such criteria, one has to ask where they
come from. Are they, sub specie aeternitatis, part of what it
means to be a fully human being, or do they come from my
multiple identities? Surely, my identities and the criteria I
use to evaluate my humanity are inextricably entangled.
Our task as educators is not to pronounce on exactly
what it means to be a human being or a person. It is, rather,
to promote a conversation on the matter. Using the analogy
of a mathematical adventure, we might start out with an
undefined term, human being, and then construct axioms
that will govern the behavior of this entity. The first might
be "A human being has a moral sense of what it means to be
a human being," and the second might be, "Identity as a
human being transcends all other identities." But, after
that, the mathematical analogy falls apart. My very sense of
what it means to be a human being grows inevitably out of
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my other identities. My other identities color what it means
to have a moral sense and how I will fill out my sense of what
is moral.
Accepting the approach I've just suggested does not
land us in relativism, for it posits the universality of moral
sense, human identity, and a positive evaluation of both.
But it is pluralistic. It recognizes that the construction of
both moral sense and human identity is influenced by
culture and, thus, by time, place and tradition. Such con
struction is a dynamic process guided by love and faith in
one another, not a search for eternal verities.

One of my own adopted sons expressed
his disappointment and depression
when he returned from a visit
to the land of his birth, Korea.
He said, ''When I am in America,
I feel like a Korean, and when I am in Korea,
I feel like an American."
This was said with the softness and infinite
sadness of the perpetual stranger.

The man whose inauguration we celebrate today has
had something to say on these matters. In one article with
which I am familiar, he challenged the Kohlbergian model
of moral development as simplistic and in conflict with
cross-cultural evidence. He suggested, rightly I think, that
an "adequate psychological model of high-level moral
thinking" will be considerably more complex than we have
so far acknowledged. Bloom's sixth component of such a
model is especially relevant to our consideration of mul
ticultural education. A high-level moral thinker. Bloom
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wrote, will have "a capacity and readiness to extend the self
empathically to others, as concrete individuals, rather than
as generic holders of a set of claims.
As we extend ourselves empathetically to others, we
recognize them not only as generic individuals and holders
of rights, but as concrete individuals, and concrete indi
viduals have multiple identities. In caring relations with
concrete others, we develop an appreciation for other cul
tures because it matters to those concrete others that we do
so. Here I would go beyond Lawrence Blum's third goal or
value. It is not just that we should appreciate cultural
diversity for its own sake, as I might appreciate the diversity
of birds and flowers in my garden. More than that, we try to
understand, to learn, to appreciate, because the concrete
individual whom we encounter invites us to do so.

•

We agree that students should have
some knowledge and appreciation of cultures
other than their own.
But beyond a vague agreement
at that dangerously restrictive level,
we argue—sometimes
with intemperate language—over the goals of
"multicultural education."
Recognizing that a major educational task is to develop
the kind of empathic response we've just discussed helps us
also to answer another sort of objection raised to multicul
tural education. It is often objected that we sacrifice stand
ards when we remove a Western classic from the curriculum
and replace it with a lesser known work by an ethnic or
female author. What criterion do we use for such a substitu
tion? At a meta-level, just the one that has always been
used, namely, that the people in a position to make the
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selection find it worthy on grounds they are willing to make
public. The grounds a new group offers for its selection may
differ from those established by the traditionally dominant
group. Indeed the selection may challenge not only particu
lar works formerly included but the very grounds on which
they were selected. Standards are not sacrificed. Different
standards are offered.
Why should the dominant group or any competing
subgroup accept such substitutions? The best reason I can
think of is that concrete, living others ask us in good faith to
do so. This does not mean that our precious curriculum is at
the mercy of whatever harebrained suggestions might be
made. The people making such suggestions are, or ought to
be, in a position to defend their ideas. They give us reasons
why the work is important to them and might be to us, and
because we are capable of empathic response, we give it a
try. In doing so, we acquire knowledge of other cultures,
others gain a deeper sense of their own culture, and we
express an appreciation for diversity that includes, but at
the same time goes beyond, the aesthetic. We-they gain a
greater appreciation for what it means to respond morally to
one another.
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Empathy, Altruism, and
Civic Responsibility:
The Importance of
Multicultural Education
Barry Schwartz
Professor of Psychology
Swarthmore College
•

oung babies cry at the cries of other babies. This is not
because these cries are loud or unusual, but specifically
because they are cries—signs of distress. And when a baby
cries in response to the cries it hears, this too is a sign of
distress—of what is sometimes called empathic distress.
Empathic distress of this sort is the beginning of what will
eventually become full-blown altruism. What is needed for
empathic distress to turn into altruism is the growth in
children of the ability to take the perspective of others.
The growth of the ability to take the perspective of
others occurs gradually, as part of the child's more general
increase in cognitive sophistication. In toddlers, it may take
a rudimentary form. For example, if a two-year-old child
playing happily in a room beside its mother hears another
two-year-old, playing beside its mother, start to cry, the
happy child will go over to help. It will "help" by taking the
hand of the crying child and bringing her over to its own
mother—the happy child's mother—to be comforted.
"What would I want if I was unhappy," the happy child
seems to be asking herself. "Why I'd want a hug from my
mother. So this crying child must want a hug from my
mother also." Perspective taking: imperfect, somewhat
egocentric to be sure, but perspective taking nonetheless.
As development proceeds, the egocentrism di
minishes, and children—people—become better and bet
ter able to take the perspective of others. With growing
cognitive maturity, perspective taking becomes increas-
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ingly sophisticated, conscious, and deliberate, so that, for
example, people become able to appreciate the cir
cumstances of others even when the others do not them
selves realize the trouble they are in. This is a lot of perspec
tive taking. But it's not enough; it's never enough. Without
empathic distress as a motive force, perspective taking does
not yield attempts to act—to be helpful. It isn't enough to
know what needs to be done. People also have to want to do
it. And so, while perspective taking tells people what needs
to be done, empathy makes people want to do it. Together,
they yield altruism.^
Does this mean that with mature perspective taking
and empathy in place, we can count on people to come to the
aid of anyone in need? No it doesn't. Even with mature and
deliberate perspective taking in place, there are many fac
tors that may mitigate against coming to the aid of someone
in distress—factors including the number of other people
who seem also to be in a position to help and the potential
cost or risk to the prospective helper. Especially important
in the context of this symposium, adults are much more
likely to come to the aid of people in distress if these people
are perceived as like them rather than unlike them—like
them in age, gender, race, class, and so on.
I began my remarks on educating for civic responsibil
ity in a multicultural world with a brief lesson on altruism
for two reasons. First, it is my view that among the most
important qualities that a good liberal arts education should
promote are just those qualities—empathy and perspective
taking—that are necessary for altruism. And second, I be
lieve that the central ideas in Alfred Bloom's inaugural
address are quite directly related to empathy, perspective
taking, and altruism. First, Al talked about rituals (li) as
serving to transform events into contexts in which ethical
growth—ethical vision—occurs. He described a "vertical"
shift from unconscious to consciously chosen values. Let
me suggest that this process can be likened to the develop
ment of self-consciousness about perspective taking that is
a central part of the growth of altruism. But more than this
"vertical shift" is needed. Bloom told us. Also needed is the
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“horizontal" dimension—multicultural education. Let me
suggest that this process can be understood as acknowledg
ing that people will be inclined to help only those who are
like them, and to be aimed at enlarging people's under
standing of just who exactly is "like them" and in what
ways.

Knowledge is not enough.
Enough immersion into the lives of others is
needed so that people will feel the pain others
suffer—the pain of poverty, of violence,
of sickness, of uncertainty about the future
for themselves and for their children.

But Bloom suggested that still more is needed. Knowl
edge is not enough. Enough immersion into the lives of
others is needed so that people will feel the pain others
suffer—the pain of poverty, of violence, of sickness, of un
certainty about the future for themselves and for their chil
dren. This, I think, is what Nel Noddings was getting at
when she wrote about the importance of regarding others as
concrete and not generic individuals. Only this intimate and
detailed experience with concrete individuals will engen
der the empathy that powers knowledge into action. With
out this intimate experience, what we have, as Bloom put it,
is "an abstract commitment to tolerance that keeps others at
a distance." With it, we can have a lifelong commitment to
social justice. As novelist Graham Greene once said, "you
can't love humanity; you can only love people." And it is
only from entering the lived experience of other people that
this love, this empathy, can develop.
Since space does not permit a more elaborate and
nuanced account of empathy, perspective taking, and al
truism, I must hope that the reader finds my rapid-fire
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account at least reasonable, if not compelling. But even if I
have succeeded, what my story about altruism implies
about the future direction of the university is not simple
and unproblematic. If people mostly help others who are
like themselves, then perhaps we should work to build a
strong national identity and culture—perhaps we should
teach students the classic texts and ideas that have formed
our culture, and encourage assimilation. Perhaps we should
bring in people of many cultures, but turn out people of a
single culture. This way, it is sometimes argued, lies the
strengthening—perhaps the very survival—of America and
the American ideal. You can't create "civic responsibility"
(part of the theme of this inauguration and one of the aims of
Alfred Bloom's presidency) in the absence of a common
civic culture and society to which all bear allegiance.
Multiculturalism—the celebration of difference—pulls
people apart, creating what Nodding, Henry Louis Gates,
and others have called an "identity politics" that divides and
redivides people into interest groups that get smaller and
smaller, narrower and narrower, more and more conten
tious, until the very idea of civic responsibility becomes
incoherent. Responsibility to the self—of course. Responsi
bility to one's (racial, gender, class) allies—sure. But re
sponsibility to society—nonsense.

•

In business, in law, in medicine,
and in most other occupations,
we have as a culture created an atmosphere
that makes it extremely easy for people
to leave their ethical commitments at home
when they leave for work each day.
•
This is not meant to be a caricature. There can be a real
conflict—even perhaps a contradiction—between civic re
sponsibility on the one hand and multiculturalism on the
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other. As Noddings pointed out in her paper, allegiances to
different identity groups (woman, philosopher, mother,
dean) can pull one in different directions. And identity
group allegiance and broader societal allegiance can also
pull one in different directions.
As readers of this volume probably know, there is
much debate right now on many campuses about the chal
lenge posed by multiculturalism to the traditional
curriculum—to the canon, as it's called. Critics of multicul
turalism don't object to adding things to the curriculum.
The trouble is that if you add some things, you must take
other things away. Students are probably unwilling to
submit to an undergraduate education that continues in
definitely, and parents are certainly unwilling to pay for it.
This is what critics object to: taking things away thins the
common culture, and with the thinning of common culture
perhaps comes the thinning of civic responsibility.
But as both Noddings and Frank Wong suggest, this is
the world we live in. As many have pointed out—most
recently and forcefully economist Lester Thurow in his new
book. Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among
Japan, Europe and America—we are at the end of the "Ameri
can Century. "2 Whether and why this is good or bad can be
debated on another occasion; that it is true is, I think, not
debatable. And the fact that the U.S. must now take its place
as one nation among many is reflected within the U.S. by the
demand by all kinds of groups that were previously kept
silenced—blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, women,
gays and lesbians—that the time has come for them to be
heard. This simply is the world we live in. And living in it,
we must find a way to live with the tensions and contradic
tions between unity and pluralism—between civic respon
sibility and identity politics—that it poses. And the only
way to do that may be by taking multiculturalism seriously
enough that we can come to understand both what makes
cultures different and what unites them. It is the differences
among cultures that are usually most obvious. The
similarities, some of which were pointed out by Bloom, are
more subtle, often requiring careful reflection and study to
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become apparent. For this reason, serious multicultural
education in just the sort of setting—the university—that
permits careful reflection and study may be the best chance
we have to enable people to discover what they have in
common with others who seem on the surface to be wholly
different. A harmonious result of multicultural education is
by no means guaranteed. The tension between unity and
pluralism is real and should not be swept under the rug. But
the genie is out of the bottle, and it would take a colossal
amount of force, resulting, perhaps, in a great deal of
destruction, to push it back in.
The need for multicultural education would not seem
pressing if each of the cultural, racial, and ethnic groups
that make up the United States was granted a full measure of
respect. The need for multicultural education would not
seem pressing if, for example, we could say, with confi
dence, to someone who argued that the Los Angeles police
would never be convicted of brutality by a jury that has no
blacks on it: “Don't be ridiculous. Look at the evidence. No
one could possibly deny what the videotape tells them." But
the events in Los Angeles following the Rodney King ver
dict, which preceded our inauguration by just a few days
and cast a shadow long enough to reach us even in Swarth
more, should have convinced everyone that the need for
multicultural education is pressing—that rather than being
fortified and defended, a canon that allows the almost in
conceivable outcome of the Simi Valley trial to occur should
be disarmed, if not completely dismantled.
The challenge to the canon and the growth of identity
politics within the university has brought universities a
great deal of public attention in recent years. Each of the
major national news magazines has had numerous feature
stories devoted to the “politicization" of the campus and
that “McCarthyism of the left"—political correctness. Most
of our major universities, it is claimed, are foisting a "party
line"—a set of political, social, and moral values—on un
suspecting students in the guise of teaching value-free
facts. In response to this claim, a conservative backlash to
multiculturalism has percolated to the surface both within
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and without the university. But despite the sensationalized
scare stories that one reads about how political correctness
has taken over the university, most universities struggle
mightily in most of their activities to avoid it. Most of the
time, universities try to teach students "facts" that are
value-free. And more important, they try to give students
the tools that are also value-free for discovering new facts.
For the most part, universities leave values—political, reli
gious, social; all but the values of intellectual openness and
honesty—alone.

•

The fact that the United States
must now take its place as one nation
among many is reflected within
the United States by the demand by all kinds
of groups that were previously kept
silenced—blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans,
women, gays and lesbians—that the time has
come for them to be heard.
This simply is the world we live in.
•

Does this mean that universities don't care about what
students do with the "facts" and "tools" they are being
given? Of course not. They—we—do care. We don't want
students polluting the earth. We don't want them endanger
ing people with the products they make. We don't want
them to be indifferent to the suffering of others. We don't
want them to be racist and sexist. We care a great deal about
their development as persons—their moral development.
But generally, we in the university lack the confidence to
insist on these things, or to teach them. So instead, we teach
what we do have confidence about and hope that students
will acquire the right values on their own, either by accident
or as an implicit byproduct of their explicit academic work.
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What is the result of the university's collective lack of
moral confidence and courage? I believe that the university
bears at least part of the responsibility for an attitude that
has come to pervade the workplace in recent years that
expertise, knowledge, and technique can be acquired and
developed in a way that is completely divorced from values.
"We give you the tools, but what you do with them is up to
you," universities seem to be saying. And employers echo
these sentiments, the better to castigate employees and
exonerate themselves when some dramatic ethical or legal
transgression is uncovered. In business, in law, in medi
cine, and in most other occupations, we have as a culture
created an atmosphere that makes it extremely easy for
people to leave their ethical commitments at home when
they leave for work each day.

Adults are much more likely to come to the
aid of people in distress
if these people are perceived as like them
rather than unlike them—
like them in age, gender, race, class, and so on.

In politics, the pragmatic triumphs over the moral.
Concern for winning elections so dominates the political
landscape that when, on rare occasions, a politician seems
to articulate a consistent, principled position, savvy
analysts immediately and cynically try to ferret out the deep
political strategy that this apparently principled position is
"really" serving. Manipulation of the electorate and the
media, and responsiveness to those who can finance cam
paigns, have become a part of everyone's understanding of
what politics is. It's a bit odd, in this light, that so many
people are upset at the prospect that H. Ross Perot (who is
leading in the polls at this writing) might "buy" the pre-
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sidency, as if there were any other way to attain major
elective office these days.’ Twenty-five years ago, Joe
McGinniss' expose of Richard Nixon's dishonest, man
ipulative 1968 presidential campaign caused great public
shock and alarm.'* Twenty-five years later, no expose is
needed, for the very same practices that had to be kept
secret by candidates a generation ago are now discussed by
candidates and analysts alike with complete openness and a
total lack of shame. This surely is one of the reasons why
"none of the above" is becoming almost everyone's choice
for every office. As Winston Churchill said, "it is hard to
look up to someone who always has his ear to the ground."
As I indicated, I believe that the university has played a
significant role in the widespread separation of ethics from
expertise that we now see. Alfred Bloom's vision of the
future university (or at least the future Swarthmore College)
represents what is potentially a striking alternative to uni
versity business as usual. There is first his focus on the
development of consciously chosen values. And there is
second his focus on connecting knowledge to action. If we
can begin to implement this vision, we can succeed in
providing an education that:
1. Makes social (that is, civic) responsibility a way of
life.
2. Makes social action the consequence of truth
seeking—of knowledge and technique—rather than sepa
rate from it.
3. And makes people who can live lives that are "holy,"
that is, whole—lives in which what they know and what
they do are intimately connected to what they value.
Our society desperately needs educational institutions
that are willing to pursue this vision, because it desperately
needs citizens whose public and private commitments have
been informed by it. Swarthmore College has the
resources—intellectual, moral, and financial—to create a
model of this vision in action from which other institutions
may learn. It is my hope that Swarthmore will succeed in
implementing the vision articulated in his inaugural ad
dress by Alfred Bloom. It is my belief that Swarthmore
College must try.
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SYMPOSIUM II
How Colleges as Institutions
Embody and Display
Civic Responsibility
in a Multicultural World
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On Civic Responsibility in a
Multicultural World
Charles L. James
Professor of English Literature
Swarthmore College

or me, here, in the twilight of the 20th century, the
specter that roams these halls is the one of William
Edward Burghardt Du Bois, whose vision at the dawn of
this same century reverberates throughout and informs our
deepest confusions—a vision that grew from a passion to
know and was simultaneously tested and nurtured in 19thcentury institutions much like our own. * A vision formu
lated in a brilliant essay in which he aimed to encapsulate
the spirit of the moment, the imprint of history, and the
consequences of politics, each in their many social and
cultural phases. From our current day perspective, I believe
that it is indeed emblematic, symbolic, and prescient that
Du Bois titled his text The Souls of Black Folk,^ as if to
suggest that black folk represent the metaphor of the 20th
century. Hear him:

F

The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of
men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of
the sea.

The expression has become, in certain circles, a cliche.
Trite, some of us say. No longer fresh, others suggest. Worn
out, still others venture. Hackneyed, we red-pencil in the
academy. But even as we learn from African proverbs, there
can be virtue in triteness, that what might be perceived by
some as hackneyed may be merely a relative judgment,
sometimes the sign of a disturbed ease. And as the Nigerian
73
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novelist Chinua Achebe reminds us, in his culture the wis
dom of the elders and the ancestors is manifest in these
well-worn phrases that are dignified by the term "proverb";
that the declining significance of such signs of knowledge
within the culture may signal an absence of direction.
In these inaugural ceremonies, these discourses, this
institution's seeking its charge and defining its responsibil
ity in a multicultural world, is the echo of a voice that won't
be stilled. It echoes without in the Simi Valley, Calif.,
verdict—the current fault line of another kind of earthquake
whose fissures reach our very doorsteps.

Du Bois has noted, I think, even in this early
hour, the challenging nature of the paradox
in the pedagogic agenda of "pluralism."
It insists that we find a way to make it
possible for a person of color to be both
her racial and ethnic self and an American,
"without being cursed and spit upon by [her]
fellows, without having the doors of
Opportunity closed roughly in [her] face."

Through the metaphor of a veil, Du Bois, too, set out to
sketch an outline—a vague, uncertain outline to be sure—
but an outline of "the spiritual world in which ten thousand
thousand Americans live and strive," and he tendered an
invitation to read that world with the drop of patience neces
sary to internalize, as he said, "the strange meaning of
being black here in the dawning of the Twentieth Century":
a sort of seventh child, "born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world." It is, indeed, a pecu-
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liar gift, this "two-ness—an American, a Negro; two souls,
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring
ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone
keeps it from being torn asunder."
The story of this painful paradox is a twice-told tale; it
has seen the light before in another guise, altered and
extended; but it comes, nonetheless, to the central problem
of training men and women for life in a world within and
without the transparent veil that otherwise skews our vision
of one and the other. Du Bois has noted, I think, even in this
early hour, the challenging nature of the paradox in the
pedagogic agenda of "pluralism." It insists that we find a
way to make it possible for a person of color to be both her
racial and ethnic self and an American, "without being
cursed and spit upon by [her] fellows, without having the
doors of Opportunity closed roughly in [her] face."
So, here we are once more, in the dusk of the 20th
century (re-)enacting an old drama and seeking to deter
mine on which side of the proscenium arch we should
stand—before or behind. Once again we are questioning.
Where do audience and performer demarcate? We in this
ivory tower, from time to time, confuse the staging with the
real thing. Rodney King-like episodes or Anita HillClarence Thomas theater do remind us of our dilemma and
our challenges, for such events recollect the power of the old
chorus role, in which the audience demands the stage and
shows with true flair what the real drama is all about. And
they will do it again and again until we get it right.
Notes
1. Du Bois studied at Fisk University, earned the A.B. from Har
vard College (1889), and both the M. A. (1891) and the Ph.D. (1895)
from Harvard University.

2. All quotations were taken from W.E.B. Du Bois Writings, The
Library of America, New York: 1986.
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Biographical Note

Charles L. James, a professor of English literature, has been
on the faculty of Swarthmore College since 1973. He is an
Americanist whose areas of special interest are African
American, African, and Caribbean literatures, and is editor
of the critical anthology From the Roots: Short Stories by Black
Americans. He is currently writing the biography of Arna
W. Bontemps.

Bathtubs, Coke Cans,
and the Culture of Science
Maxine F. Singer
President
Carnegie Institution of Washington

hese are the names of the Nobel Laureates in the natural
sciences—Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or
Medicine—from 1975 through 1988: Chandrasekhar,
Fowler, Rubbia, Van der Meer, Von Klitzing, Ruska,
Binnig, Rohrer, Bednorz, Muller, Lederman, Schwartz,
Steinberger, Taube, Merrifield, Hauptman, Karie,
Herschbach, Lee, Polyani, Cram, Lehn, Pedersen,
Deisenhofer, Hubei, Michel, McClintock, Jerne, Kohler,
Milstein, Brown, Goldstein, Cohen, Levi-Montalcini,
Tonegawa, Black, Elion, Hitchings.
Many, but not all of the names belong to Americans,
but some biographical searching is required to discern
which ones. One thing can, however, be concluded from the
list. Scientists, including the very best ones, come from a
host of national and ethnic backgrounds.
Science is, in a very real way, an international en
deavor. Good descriptions of nature, regardless of where or
when they are made, have universal standing because the
properties of the natural world are the same all over our
planet and indeed the universe. Unlike many scholarly en
deavors, national cultures, politics, economics, or religion
are irrelevant.
Archimedes lived and had his famous bathtub in Syra
cuse on the coast of Sicily in the third century before the
common era. His lasting discovery was motivated by the
need to authenticate a presumably gold crown given to his
king. The same thing that happened in the bathtub in
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Syracuse would happen in a bathtub in Wharton dormitory
two millennia later—if there were bathtubs in Wharton.
In its early years, Islam was a center of astronomical
discovery, as we still recognize in the names we give to
certain stars: Rigel and Aldebaran, for example.
Also, our now universal system for enumeration, with
its convenient base of 10, had its origins in India before the
common era and then passed through the Middle East,
probably Baghdad, before finding its way to Europe
through Muslim Spain.
The first use of vaccines to protect people from disease
was in defense against smallpox. The idea seems to have
originated long ago in China and came to the West by way
of Turkey and the wife of a British ambassador in the early
18th century.
Chagas' disease was first described by a Brazilian
biologist. It is caused by a trypanosome delivered to
humans through insect bites and is an incurable and
frequently lethal disease affecting millions of Latin
Americans. Scientists worldwide study the causative agent,
in part because it is helping to reveal previously unknown
aspects of our immune defenses.
Edwin Hubble, an American astronomer, discovered
that the universe is expanding.
It is important to emphasize here that these remarks
refer to natural science itself and not to the development of
technology, nor to the effects of social and political systems
on the doing of science. I stress that the distinction is impor
tant. Thus, in 1961, when Soviet genetics was still devas
tated from first Stalin's and then Kruschev's love affairs
with Lysenko, the solving of the genetic code was first
announced at an international meeting in Moscow. The
genetic code was an accurate description of nature, while
Lysenko's descriptions were deeply flawed. His influence
ultimately collapsed when Soviet geneticists were able to
rejoin their international colleagues, but not before Soviet
biology became an empty and arid endeavor.
Science is an elitist activity, if only because relatively
few people are scientists. Yet in all eras, those who became
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scientists were self-selected; they chose to participate. In the
list of names, there are people from rural and urban origins,
people from wealthy families and from very poor ones,
people whose families were native-born for many genera
tions and new immigrants. But they have some things in
common: an intense curiosity about the natural world, a
strong will, talent, self-confidence often bordering on arro
gance, and substantial personal energy. And of course, they
are all pretty smart, although not necessarily smarter than
people who are not scientists. It helps in becoming a scien
tist to have access to a fine education, but often personal
attributes can make up for formal training.

•

The products of science—the intellectual
and material products—are a powerful
common force homogenizing some aspects of
human life on our planet ....
Do nonscientists really want all this power
concentrated in the hands of people from
the alien scientific culture?
If not, then it is essential that nonscientists
learn enough so that they can join intelligently
in debates and decisions.

One of the names I mentioned belongs to Rita LeviMontalcini, who won a Nobel Prize for the discovery of
nerve growth factor, a landmark in our understanding of the
nervous system and a discovery that has had enormous
significance for understanding how cells of all kinds, not
just nerve cells, grow. Dr. Levi-Montalcini received the
M.D. degree in Turin in 1936, but her career as physician
was cut short, just as it was beginning, by the racial laws
promulgated by Mussolini in late 1938. In 1941, when even
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the clandestine practice of medicine to the needy became
impossible. Dr. Levi-Montalcini set up a laboratory in her
bedroom, first in Turin and later in the countryside, as her
family searched for safe hiding places. Fortunately, the fer
tilized chicken eggs she needed for her work could be
obtained with some regularity, and her hungry family
could eat the remainder after she deftly removed the
embryo.

•
Science is, in a very real way,
an international endeavor .... Unlike
many scholarly endeavors, national cultures,
politics, economics,
or religion are irrelevant.
•
Given the fact that scientists come from different reli
gions, different nationalities, different races, and different
backgrounds, it is interesting to consider whether the scien
tific community can be described as "multicultural," in the
sense that is implied by the title of our panel. The answer is a
definite no. Contemporary science is a single international
culture. The driving universal force of science is to under
stand the natural world without recourse to supernatural
explanations. The primary ethic of the scientific culture is to
do good and honest science. Language problems do not
exist because for centuries a single language has been
adopted for scientific discourse, both written and spoken:
Latin in the distant past, German beginning in the 19th
century and extending until World War II, English in the
years since 1945, perhaps another language in the years to
come. Moreover, much of scientific language is newly in
vented and commonly adopted, in order to describe freshly
discovered phenomena.
Each scientist individually belongs to some national
culture or ethnic group. But when they come together as
scientists, the traditions, the norms, the purpose, the stand-
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ards, the language, are a common set. These are strong
bonds—witnessed, for example, by scientists' activities on
behalf of colleagues worldwide whose human rights are
threatened. The rescue of Andrei Sakharov that enabled his
seminal role in recent events in eastern Europe is only the
most famous example of the significance of science as
community.
If I speak as a scientist then, the multiculturalism that
concerns me, the diversity that challenges me, is the tension
between the culture of the scientist and the culture of the
nonscientist.
This diversity, the so-called "two cultures," was first
described in 1959 by C.P. Snow, an admired and prolific
novelist and a distinguished scientist, in a small book titled
The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. Sir Charles
himself lived in both cultures, not with a foot in both
camps, but days with scientists and nights with writers.
From vast and very personal experience, he could write,
"Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension—
sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and
dislike, but most of all lack of understanding." Sir Charles
thought that the separation of the two cultures was an old
phenomenon, but growing worse. He was correct. Today,
there is not only mutual incomprehension, but the scientific
world is often barely acknowledged.
Recently I read a wonderful new book called Brooklyn,
Its People and Places, Past and Present, by Grace Glueck and
Paul Gardner. One chapter, called "Trees of Knowledge," is
about Brooklyn's high schools and the extraordinary people
who were graduated from them in this century. Erasmus
Hall High School turned out Barbra Streisand, Bernard
Malamud, and Earl Graves. Thomas Jefferson High School
produced Danny Kaye, and at my own high school, Mid
wood, Woody Allen began testing his gags and his talent.
Nowhere in the book do I find the name of Barbara McClin
tock, one of the names in my Nobel list, who was graduated
from Erasmus during World War I. Nowhere do I find the
names of three other Nobel laureates, all graduates of
Abraham Lincoln High School.
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The definition of an educated citizen of our democracy
is being widened to include knowledge of many cultures.
But, as in the book about Brooklyn, the culture of science is
still excluded from the experience and discourse of most
educated people. Yet this culture can stand as a model for
how individuals can live comfortably in different cultures
but still mold themselves into one. This is one reason for
emphasizing the importance of science in the liberal cur
riculum. For me then, to stand for civic responsibility in a
multicultural world a college would do well to include in the
course of study of all students an experience of the culture
of science including an understanding of how science learns
about the natural world.
Such an education will also speak to other aspects of
civic responsibility. Most people are eager for the fruits of
scientific discovery. Most people will readily, perhaps too
readily, set aside their own ethnic and other cultural foun
dations in pursuit of a modern cure for disease, a better
television set, a cellular telephone. The products of
science—the intellectual and material products—are a pow
erful common force homogenizing some aspects of human
life on our planet. This is not always a reason to rejoice. It
can, and has, diminished the ties holding other kinds of
cultures together, negating long-time ethnic customs and
strong family bonds. Do nonscientists really want all this
power concentrated in the hands of people from the alien
scientific culture? If not, then it is essential that nonscien
tists learn enough so that they can join intelligently in
debates and decisions about the ways that scientific knowl
edge is applied to people's lives.
The list of Nobel Prize winners I began with includes
names from different cultures and races. Therefore it is
deeply troubling that missing from the list, indeed missing
with few exceptions from the ranks of American scientists,
are African Americans. Why should there be a growing
number of black lawyers, physicians, and businessmen,
but so few and so static a number of scientists? Does the
culture of science establish barriers of the society-at-large?
Does, for example, the long training period at poor wages
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seem unattractive to people who yearn to improve their
own and their families' economic situation? Probably.
I recall a conversation I had some years ago with two gifted
young black women who were biology majors here at
Swarthmore. We spent most of a lunchtime together talking
about how few black science professors there were at
Swarthmore. Toward the end of our talk I suggested that
maybe one day they would be part of that faculty. But their
families expected them to go off to medical school, and soon
they would.

•

All children will respond with enthusiasm
if curricula are redesigned
to capture their natural curiosity.
It's not much fun to learn that Archimedes
did an experiment in a bathtub
a couple of thousand years ago. But it's a lot of
fun for all to try to understand
why a can of Coke sinks in a tub of water
while a can of Diet Coke floats.
Many factors no doubt contribute to the absence of
substantial numbers of blacks in the American scientific
community. But the single biggest reason is the failure of
our elementary and secondary schools to teach science ef
fectively, a failure that is bad enough as a general matter and
even worse when it comes to black students in our cities.
This failure itself is complex with many causes. One of these
is surely the strangeness of the culture of science to those
who teach our young. It is not included in their educations
any more than it is in the educations of our lawyers, minis
ters, accountants, or professors of the humanities. The
teachers, however, all have the responsibility for a science
curriculum. They undertake that obligation with fear and
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dislike, and rapidly convey that to the children. The chil
dren ask marvelous and sound questions. And they get
either wrong answers or silence. Their lessons consist of
memorizing a lot of dumb words that the teachers don't
understand and that scientists rarely use.

•

We steadfastly condone miserable science
teaching because neither the teachers
nor the parents nor the school boards
can tell the difference between astrology and
astronomy, nor between medical quackery
and good medical practice, nor the fundamental
distinction between a scientific explanation
of the history of life on our planet and
the creation myths associated with religions.
•
Our children are poorly served by such teaching, es
pecially in a country that depends totally on science for all
its everyday affairs—for its energy, communications,
transportation, health, for the very quality of the air it
breathes—in a country where the best employment oppor
tunities require some scientific knowledge and a lot of
technical skill. Yet we steadfastly condone miserable science
teaching because neither the teachers nor the parents nor the
school boards can tell the difference between astrology and
astronomy, nor between medical quackery and good medi
cal practice, nor the fundamental distinction between a
scientific explanation of the history of life on our planet and
the creation myths associated with religions. And the scien
tific community itself, largely divorced from the training of
teachers and the design of school curricula, shares in the
blame.
Here then is another way for colleges, through atten
tion to science and its culture, to foster civic responsibility:
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by participating in a revolution in science teaching,
through college curricula and through inspiring and pre
paring students for the teaching profession. Small colleges
of excellence like Swarthmore lead the nation in the produc
tion of students who go on for advanced scientific training.
Perhaps they should strive to lead the nation in the produc
tion of science teachers who will go on to instruct and
inspire the young, especially those who have been tradi
tionally ignored. To do this will require substantial changes
in the way science is taught in order to emphasize the
significance and process of science, its problem-solving
nature, its concern for how things are, and its provisional
nature rather than the usual set of facts that constitute many
college-level science courses.
Once it is recognized that science is itself a unique
culture, then one can understand why scientists are
troubled by efforts to redesign school science curricula in
ways that compromise the integrity and universality of sci
ence in order to reach those who were not previously effec
tively engaged. I do not object here to the inclusion of
biographical information about black scientists and their
contributions in these curricula. (Although I would, par
enthetically, point out that there is precious little evidence to
suggest that such information about white boys and girls in
science is included.) But I do object to teaching children bad
science no matter the reason, and from what I've read, that is
exactly what some of the newly designed curricula do.
Moreover, these curricula apparently mimic the mistakes of
most current primary school science programs by assuming
that teaching biography, or history, or even sets of facts, is
the way to teach young children science. Black children will
not be engaged by science simply by coloring black the
failed methods that have been used for decades in our
schoolrooms. But all children will respond with enthusiasm
if curricula are redesigned to capture their natural curiosity.
It's not much fun to learn that Archimedes did an experi
ment in a bathtub a couple of thousand years ago. But it's a
lot of fun for all to try to understand why a can of Coke sinks
in a tub of water while a can of Diet Coke floats.
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Good citizenship and leadership in the coming cen
tury will be measured against contributions to education,
and particularly to science education. It is only through
such efforts that we can assure access to productive and
interesting lifetime jobs for all children. It is only through
such efforts that we can assure a national economic well
being that is essential to a high standard of living for all. It is
only through such efforts that we can assure that a nation of
literate people is able to cope with the problems and chal
lenges of the future, problems and challenges that will, to a
large extent, be defined by science and technology.

Biographical Note
Maxine Frank Singer (Class of '52) is president of the Car
negie Institution of Washington. Her interest in nucleic acid
enzymology began with studies on the enzyme polynu
cleotide phosphorylase during her postdoctoral work at the
National Institutes of Health. In 1988 Dr. Singer received the
Distinguished Presidential Rank Award, the highest honor
given to a civil servant.

The University
as a Responsible Civic Agent
in a Multicultural World
Fernando Rosas Moscoso
Provost
University of Lima, Peru

oday's world is characterized by a complex interrelation
between cultures, so that none remains isolated and all
form what one could call a universal or planetary culture.
This process of cultural universalization is nurtured by the
development of technology, in all its multiple manifesta
tions, and by transformations at the level of collective con
sciousness. These processes bring about what some have
defined as a planetary cultural conscience. Such a process
does not imply the disappearance of the historical diversity
that has accompanied humanity from the beginning. On
the contrary, the present cultural problematic centers on the
search for an organic relation between the process of cul
tural universalization and the maintenance of multiple and
specific cultural realities that characterize the group of
present societies. An appreciation of diversity in unity leads
to a world view in which the consolidation of planetary
cultural unity takes into account awareness of and respect
for diversity, and in which the survival of such cultural
diversity implies the acceptance of the process of cultural
unification.
Contemporary humans are perfectly conscious of the
cultural problematic and cultural dynamic in which they are
inevitably immersed. Modern humans feel and live the
universal concretely, outside theoretical speculation. And
yet the planetary culture, which exists through the identifi-
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cation of common elements and the compromise with such
elements, can only be fully possible through the respect and
awareness of cultural diversity. In this sense, one could
affirm that the future of humanity is connected with the
finding of an equilibrium between the process of cultural
universalization and the maintenance of cultural diversity.
This would issue in a synthesis that would make of culture a
legacy of all humanity.
As Bonfil Batalla has pointed out, reflecting on the case
of Mexico but applicable, I think, to today's world in gen
eral: "Cultural diversity would be not only a real situation
that one recognizes as a point of departure but a central goal
of the entire project. In other words, we must develop a
multicultural world without losing that characteristic."
From this perspective, human development means the nur
turing of cultural diversity even when we are engaged in
the construction of a planetary culture. That is, planetary
culture cannot sustain itself if the world ceases to be mul
ticultural.
This reflection is vital for our definition of civic respon
sibility for new generations. This implies the identification
and the valuation of cultural diversity, and the moral obliga
tion to it, as one of the more central aspects of contemporary
society.

The University and the Multicultural
If there is one institution that is morally obligated to uphold
the multicultural, it is the university. Ever since its origins
in the 13th century, the university has become the institu
tion providing a multicultural space. The university was
always influenced by a universal spirit. This was man
ifested in the confluence of students from diverse places in
Europe who gathered in the so-called "nations." Such
people came to fashion the very structure of the university.
On the other hand, culture and its different manifestations
were the object of university reflection from the beginning.
The university was then, from the beginning, interna
tional and hence multicultural. Be it in Paris, Bologna, or

The University in a Multicultural World

89

Salamanca, they all demonstrated, in the initial years, the
multidimensional search of science and knowledge as a
whole. Later, of course, these universities took on a more
national character under the fluctuating political context.
But early on it was established that science did not recognize
frontiers and that the university, a principal generator of
science, developed in a multicultural context par excellence.

•

Universities do not seek only
to create and diffuse knowledge but also
to enrich individuals spiritually.
This is in order to arrive at a better world.
To reach that end requires more than
academic, administrative, or technological
excellence.

It should be noted that the university was, without
doubt, the institution that gave the greatest impetus to the
universalization of culture. This was not only because of the
content of its teaching but due to its own internal structure.
Its autonomy in the face of political powers obtained, for
example, in Paris in 1229 or at Oxford in 1214, permitted a
full educative and scientific activity, spilling over from the
urban centers where they were located and becoming inter
national.
The privileges that determined the influence of the
university from the 13th century on, and that centered their
relation with the multicultural, were its autonomy, its right
to free expression and protest, and its monopoly in the
awarding of titles and degrees. We must not forget the ritual
aspects through which the university showed a profound
solidarity, besides international and regional diversities.
The initiation rites to the university life, the graduation
rites, the opening of the academic year, and the rites of
changing authorities, all of them confirmed the solidity of
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the work, the relations, and the objectives of the university
community.
In this sense, a return to its origins shows us a univer
sity profoundly tied to universalization and hence to the
multicultural. Universalization and multiculturalism are
the most characteristic signs of its nature and condition.
Today, this initial relation has become even more profound.
When one observes or participates in university life, one
sees how such a small universe, such a microcosm in the
nurturance of knowledge, becomes a reflection of the
human macrocosm. At the same time, we understand the
university as an institution with a responsibility magnified
by the very knowledge and understanding of its own di
mensions and potential for the construction of a better
world.

University Teaching in the U.S.A, and Multiculturalism
Without trying to develop an analysis of North American
education, we can point out the key characteristics that
connect its action to multiculturalism. The phenomenon of
education in the United States, with its explosive develop
ment, overwhelmed the canons and the limits of the Euro
pean university system. It released an unexpected potential
through the unrestricted creation of new centers of learn
ing, of autonomy, and of humanistic, scientific, and
technological cultivation. In a multicultural country par
excellence, built with the contribution of the most diverse
human groups and with a democratic society, higher educa
tion opted to commit itself with efficiency and pragmatism.
In this context, higher education here came to give
emphasis, among other things, to basic and applied investi
gation as well as to the process of creation and innovation.
From this came about a concept of the university that had to
satisfy humanity's aspiration to progress and which, there
fore, had explicitly social ends. The universities here pursue
a university immersed in the reality on which it acts and
from which it renews its resources.
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The ideal of the universities of this country recognizes
the necessity to form highly capable professionals and in
vestigators who have survived a very selective and competi
tive process. This is now being applied within a selectivity
that need not eliminate the multicultural reality that charac
terizes the university and the country as a whole.
The university and the college system in this country
are very special contexts that favor the consolidation of a
multicultural education. These institutions are better pre
pared to respond to the contemporary challenge of a mul
ticultural world with a system that at the same time pursues
the satisfaction and aspirations of individuals. It seems
evident to me that a multicultural education ought to re
spond not only to the quantitative dimension of minorities
or majorities. Rather, such dedication to a multicultural
education ought to be the product of a profound identifica
tion with multicultural values. This means also that it must
show respect for all the manifestations of multiculturalism.
Such manifestations are connected not only with the educa
tional system but go deeper into society in general. That is
why higher education here became early on one of the more
representative educational models of the modern world.

The Dynamics of the Contemporary Multicultural World
We can say that in today's world the problematic of culture
constitutes one of the great problems requiring our reflec
tion. There are many expressions of the dynamic of the
contemporary multicultural world. Some of them came
from centuries ago and others are closely attached to the
present, but all are involved in today's cultural process.
Considering this idea we can mention, among others:
The reshaping and the integration of space. As early as the 15th
century began the integration of spaces that until then were
marginal. This built, slowly, a geographic planetary synthe
sis. The process of integration of the world's spaces lasted
five centuries and has as one of its most important land-
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marks the “discovery" of this continent. This began the
process that has made the world one common dwelling for
contemporary humanity.

The integration of knowledge. In a complex and long process,
humanity evolved from the widely dispersed cultural cen
ters of antiquity to the unified and universal scientific
community of the present. Despite difficulties and draw
backs, we have arrived at a high level of knowledge integra
tion. Universities played a crucial role in this process.
The evolution of the instruments of diffusion of knowledge.
After a long period where the oral tradition provided the
mechanism of the transmission of knowledge, the arrival of
writing reduced everything to the printed page, to the writ
ten text. Civilizations grounded in the written text domi
nated and subjugated the oral societies in a violent and
complex process of assimilation. The rule of the written text
was long and fruitful until the arrival of the electronic era
(the uses of electronic media for the transmission of knowl
edge) . This era began a new dimension of human being and
has in the computer one of its most representative expres
sions. However, the transition from handwritten to elec
tronic texts has not been without tensions and resistances.
Everything is now communicated in images and sounds
and the electronic text has displaced the handwritten text.

The paradox of cultural pluralism and planetary culture. These
tendencies, apparently contrary, are becoming integrated in
an inexorable dynamic in today's world, as we pointed out
above. The theory that explains this tendency began to be
formulated in the 18th century. One of its leading represen
tatives is G. Vico but it can also be found in many ideas
expressed before the French Revolution. In our century,
several documents, such as the Mexico Document of 1982
(UNESCO), gathered the general ideas of the problem. In
this document one finds: “One must recognize the equality
and dignity of all cultures as well as the right of each cultural
community to affirm and preserve its cultural identity and
to demand respect." Later the text specifies that the exis-
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tence of different cultural groups within the modern state
must be taken into account. This is so because the influence
that these groups exert in the modern state, with a spirit of
tolerance, constitutes an important factor of equilibrium
that permits a more harmonious development and progress
of the national and international community. This acknowl•

In Peru, as well as in the United States,
higher education tries to form
not only professionals and scientists
but also human beings
with a profound humanist and social spirit.
•
edgement and defense of a cultural pluralism does not go
against the construction of a planetary culture at which we
are arriving as a consequence of the technological develop
ment and the advances of the sciences.

Individual Development:
Values and Social Responsibilities
The discourse of cultural pluralism and higher education
ought not to forget the development of the individual at the
level of values, where ethics and social responsibility are
the main pillars.
Higher education cannot be reduced to the creation and
diffusion of knowledge. It must engage the consolidation of
a responsibility to society, identifying and perfecting
human values in the service of that end. Its ethical function
manifests itself in many ways; for example, in the identifica
tion of professional ethics, in the exercise of a scientific
ethic, or in the cultivation of values that are the foundations
of human social relations.
Educational institutions are not only centers of knowl
edge, they are also centers for the formation and realization
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of the full human being. Indeed, universities do not seek
only to create and diffuse knowledge but also to enrich
individuals spiritually. This is in order to arrive at a better
world. To reach that end requires more than academic,
administrative, or technological excellence. It is as well the
product of a philosophy and a mystique that not all institu
tions have. The university's task then is not only the grant
ing of degrees but also the forming of sensible human
beings engaged with society and its values.
•

The university was, from the beginning,
international and hence multicultural.
Be it in Paris, Bologna, or Salamanca,
they all demonstrated, in the initial years,
the multidimensional search of science
and knowledge as a whole,
•

In a world like ours, it is even more urgent to give a
humanistic and ethical dimension to the formation of our
students. Within that ample field of action, higher educa
tion is one of the best instruments to achieve a conscious
ness of the multicultural dimension of the contemporary
society and to foster conscious action within the formative
process of the planetary culture. The university has a re
sponsibility to reaffirm the values of cultural diversity as a
means to achieve the progress of humanity.

Higher Education: Action Toward Civic Responsibility
The formative process of civic responsibility in a multicul
tural world ought to engage the student from a variety of
perspectives.

On the academic plane. We must create a curricular structure
that, within the characteristics of each field of study, main-
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tains a conception of integral formation. Such integral for
mation must be composed of humanistic, scientific, and
technological components including all levels of academic
counsel. Certainly, the consolidation of the relationship
between student and professor constitutes a most impor
tant aspect of the process.

On the spiritual plane. We must find activities that comple
ment the academic formation from a cultural and ethical
point of view—an ensemble of activities that sustains
humanistic and social values in a practical and direct way.

On the external integration plane. We must promote a vital
contact with different cultural contexts. Knowledge of and
relationship with such diverse social and human realities
will contribute to the enrichment of the student's integral
formation.
On the civic action plane. We must engage the student with
social and cultural reality and encourage participation in
activities of high civic responsibility. The complex social
problematic that surrounds the student will provide a suffi
cient field of action.
All these levels must be mobilized to the extent that
higher education must fulfill a social function. Higher edu
cation must be at the service of society. That is why the
members of such communities should be encouraged by
the institutional structures. To conceive of the institutions
of higher education as centers of production of egoist and
isolated knowledge is to betray a covenant with the social
structures that give them sense: with society. The univer
sity can only fulfill its educational mission and exercise with
greatest efficiency its civic function by engaging and serv
ing society. This must be done without abandoning the
necessary mechanisms that make possible intellectual and
scientific production. By integrating social responsibility
with disciplinary mechanisms, we shall find in those mech
anisms the creative effervescence that society needs in order
to shake loose from its contradictions and limitations.
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Concluding Remarks
One of the most rewarding goals of higher education is to
form new generations. Through this task the professor be
comes a teacher, and the student breaks away from his
narrow field of study and integrates himself into the society
that surrounds him. Both students and teachers must be
conscious of the role they must play and the responsibility
they have in the construction of a better world.
In this important task, educational institutions of all
scopes and contexts come together and coincide. In Peru, as
well as in the United States, higher education tries to form
not only professionals and scientists but also human beings
with a profound humanist and social spirit. Peru may have
many problems, but that should not lead us to renounce the
high principles that underlie the true educational task, be
cause truly the richest legacy of a country is its people.
In this sense, the United States exhibits as its riches not
so much the power of its weapons nor the strength of its
economy but the virtue of a higher education where science
and praxis go together within a context of liberties that
permit a personal and collective fulfillment. In this sense
Swarthmore College constitutes a point of reference that
stands out in the field of education both within and beyond
the boundaries of this great country. This is a consequence
both of the academic excellence of the institution and of the
personal qualities of each and every one of the members of
its community.

Biographical Note

Fernado Rosas Moscoso is provost of the University of
Lima, a private university in Lima, Peru. A historian by
training. Dr. Rosas Moscoso has published and lectured
widely on Latin American political events. As provost of the
University of Lima, he has nurtured a strong international
presence. He has also supported programs geared to attract
Peruvian students from different social and economic
backgrounds.

Pluralism
and Its Discontents
Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
W.E.B. Du Bois Professor of the Humanities
Harvard University

hat the college curriculum has, over the past decade,
become a matter of vigorous political contestation is
perhaps not altogether a bad thing. As the political theorist
Amy Gutmann has argued, "In a democracy, political dis
agreement is not something that we should generally seek
to avoid. Political controversies over our educational prob
lems are a particularly important source of social progress
because they have the potential for educating so many
citizens."
Certainly the last several years have provided an occa
sion for testing the hypothesis. Proponents of curricular
change and of retrenchment alike have had to marshal and
clarify their arguments; it would no longer do to preach
merely to the choir. Each has had the opportunity to pick
holes in the other's arguments, and, in honest moments of
reflection, to consider the legitimate objections raised by
the other side. Academics came to realize that it would no
longer do to talk solely among themselves, as more Ameri
cans outside the academy were being brought into the
conversation. The inhabitants of an ivory tower were re
minded that the tower was part of a larger society and
supported with scarce resources from that society. This, I
think, was the good news.
At the same time, however, the polarizing tendency of
the debates could sometimes distort, as polemics often do,
the real issues at hand. As the literary critic Gayatri Spivak
writes:
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Sometimes, with the best of intentions and in the name
of convenience, an institutionalized double-standard
tends to get established: one standard of preparation and
testing for our own kind and quite another for the rest of the
world. Even as we join in the struggle to establish the
institutional study of marginality we must still go on saying
"And yet . . . "

In the same spirit, we're often a little too ready to let
pass bad arguments for a good cause. And these bad argu
ments, among proponents of curricular reform, often center
around notions of representation, cultural equity, and selfesteem. It may be worth addressing these notions, however
cursorily, in turn.
As the literary historian John Guillory observes, "The
assumption has been that canonical authors in some sense
'represent' their race, gender, or class constituencies, rather
as legislators might represent their constituencies. ... "
Unfortunately, as Guillory comments, "It may well be
easier to make the canon representative than the university
itself." Moreover, the "reduction of the text to the 'voice' of
an author comes at a certain long-term cost, while the
telegraphic invocation of race/class/gender signals a failure
to produce a systemic analysis." And he notes an interest
ing paradox, I think, in the identity politics of selfaffirmation.
The pedagogic agenda of "pluralism" has been exhausted in
the gesture of "opening the canon." . . . [Yet].while it is easy
enough to conceive of an affirmative racial or sexual identity,
it makes very little sense to posit an affirmative (lower) class
identity. [For] the affirmation of a lower class identity is
hardly compatible with a program for the abolition of want.

In short, the notion of social representation, applied in
a consistent way, would immediately lead to absurd and
untenable results.
Hand in hand with this conflation of textual and politi
cal representation has been a suspension of literary or
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aesthetic judgment. How did this come about? "Taste is not
an index of morality/' John Ruskin once opined. "Taste is
morality." Today, we've inverted Ruskin to insist that taste
is immorality, or at least that judgments of taste were an
unsuitable activity to engage in while children were watch
ing. Not that anyone ever stopped judging: It simply en
tered into the circuits of gossip, became something done
furtively and on the sly, and left the ambit of the profession.
I'm not sure this is progress. In this regard, Hannah Arendt
wrote illuminatingly about taste judgments as a political
faculty:

They do not compel in the sense in which demonstrable
facts or truth proved by argument compel agreement. They
share with political opinions that they are persuasive; the
judging person—as Kant says quite beautifully—can only
"woo the consent of everyone else" in the hope of coming to
an agreement with him eventually. . . . Culture and politics,
then, belong together because it is not knowledge or truth
which is at stake, but rather judgment and decision, the
judicious exchange of opinion about the sphere of public life
and the common world, and the decision what manner of
action is to be taken in it, as well as how it is to look
henceforth, what kinds of things are to appear in it.
And the sort of conversation and contestation that nor
mally surround literary and cultural assessments, however
contingent, can be a valuable part of literary pedagogy.
Once a text by, say, Alice Walker becomes essentialized as
the Eternal Black Feminine, however, this kind of conversa
tion can no longer take place, because then you are no
longer debating the value of a work, but of a social genus.
The notion of "cultural equity" proceeds by just such a
personification, unfortunately: As people enjoy equal
standing under the law, so too must the products of culture.
The problem, clearly, is that the proposition is unintelligi
ble: It requires that we could measure works on a scale and
declare them equivalent by some magical metric.
Today, pace Yeats, even the mediocre lack all convic
tion. For us Thoroughly Modern Millies, nothing is easier
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than to attack the straw men of disinterest, neutrality, im
partiality, detachment, objectivity, and the like. Nor is it
difficult to demonstrate the way in which the humanities
have, from their inception, been riven by the social divi
sions of humanity, whether sexual, "racial," or ethnic. And
yet our terms of disapprobation—the accusations of bias
that we level—seem inevitably to incorporate the very nor
mative dimension we deny. After all, the concept of bias
only has meaning in contrast to the ideal of disinterest.
Absent this ideal, we can only contest bias in favor of other
biases and make no appeal that transcends the localities of
our discourse. "The oppressed have different purposes and
wants from their oppressors," Richard Rorty observes, "but
they do not have deeper insight into reality."
Rather than seeking to "lay bare" underlying realities,
therefore, we might see our task as the contraposition of
different interests, different perspectives. But I do not think
that we are therefore condemned to the more reductive
forms of cognitive relativism or "standpoint epis
temologies," which often hide within them another appeal
to the transcendental—often a magical notion of a group
identity whose coherence may be vouchsafed by Plato, or
by God ... but never by the vagaries of history or lived
experience.
And, of course, the same reductive forms of identity
politics conduce to the self-esteem school of pedagogy, a
view of education as a sort of 12-Step Program to Recovery.
The difficulty arises when the promotion of self-esteem is
offered as a rationale for curricular revision. Now, as it
happens, a significant amount of research has been con
ducted in educational psychology on this topic, and it turns
out to have no empirical support. (When Laotian students
in California ace their exams, it isn't because the cur
riculum reinforces a rich sense of their Laotian cultural
heritage.) There is simply no evidence to support the propo
sition that self-esteem is causally related to school achieve
ment. There is, on the other hand, some evidence that
school achievement is causally related to self-esteem.
The din of this debate has also drowned out the simple,
homely truth that curricular change in history or literature
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is irrelevant if a kid doesn't know how to read or write or
add. And that's the real crisis in American education: a new
generation of kids who are going to be functionally illiter
ate. Forty-four percent of black Americans can't read the
front page of the newspaper. Faced with brutal facts like
that one, much of the high-flown rhetoric about the "canon"
becomes staggeringly beside the point.

•

The din of this debate
has also drowned out the simple, homely truth
that curricular change
in history or literature is irrelevant if a kid
doesn't know how to read
or write or add.
And that's the real crisis in American
education: a new generation of
kids who are going to be functionally illiterate.
•
Now, I say all this as a sort of deflationary preface
because I think it's worth trying to keep ourselves honest as
those of us who care about curricular reform continue to toil
in the academic vineyard. Bad arguments may do for other
people, but we can't eifford them ourselves. I also think it's
worth restoring more of a historical perspective on the
project of curricular development. That the curriculum
changes has always been the case. A curriculum that didn't
change would be a historical innovation. Sometimes it's not
so clear who's the traditionalist and who's the Young Turk.
These days, the tendency to broaden our educational
vistas is, of course, often called "multiculturalism"—a
sweet or bitter mouthful, depending on your sympathies.
To both its proponents and its antagonists, multiculturalism
represents—either refreshingly or frighteningly—a radical
departure. Like most claims for cultural novelty, though,
this one is more than a little exaggerated. For both the
challenges of cultural pluralism and the varied forms of
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official resistance to it go back to the very founding of our
republic.
In the university today, it must be admitted, the chal
lenge has taken on a peculiar inflection. But the underlying
questions are time tested. What does it mean to be an
American? Must academic inquiry be subordinated to the
requirements of national identity? Should scholarship and
education reflect our actual diversity, or should it, rather,
forge a communal identity that may not yet have been
achieved?
•

To speak of a curriculum
untouched by political concerns is to
imagine, as no one does, that
education can take place in a vacuum ....
Education has never been exempt
from the kind of debate
that marks every
other aspect of American political life.
•
For answers you can, of course, turn to the latest
jeremiad on the subject from, say, George Will, Dinesh
D'Souza, or Roger Kimball. But in fact these questions have
always occasioned lively disagreement among American
educators. In 1917, William Henry Hulme decried "the in
sidious introduction into our scholarly relations of the polit
ical propaganda of a wholly narrow, selfish, and vicious
nationalism and false patriotism." His opponents were
equally emphatic in their beliefs. "More and more clearly,"
Fred Lewis Pattee ventured in 1919, "is it seen now that the
American soul, the American conception of demacracy,
Americanism, should be made prominent in our school
curriculums, as a guard against ihe rising spirit of experi
mental lawlessness. ..." Sound familiar?
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Given the political nature of the debate over education
and the national interest, the conservative penchant for
charging the multiculturalists with "politics" is a little
perplexing. For conservative critics, to their credit, have
never hesitated to provide a political defense of what they
consider to be the "traditional" curriculum: The future of
the republic, they argue, depends on the inculcation of
proper civic virtues. What these virtues are is a matter of
vehement dispute. But to speak of a curriculum untouched
by political concerns is to imagine, as no one does, that
education can take place in a vacuum. It's because we've
entrusted our schools with the fashioning of a democratic
policy that education has never been exempt from the kind
of debate that marks every other aspect of American politi
cal life.
And while I'm sympathetic to what Robert Nisbet once
dubbed the "academic dogma"—the ideal of knowledge for
its own sake—I also believe that truly humane learning,
unblinkered by the constraints of narrow ethnocentrism,
can't help but expand the limits of human understanding
and social tolerance. Those who fear that "Balkanization"
and social fragmentation lie this way have got it exactly
backward. Ours is a world that already is fissured by na
tionality, ethnicity, race, and gender. And the only way to
transcend those divisions—to forge, for once, a civic culture
that respects both differences and commonalities—is
through education that seeks to comprehend the diversity of
human culture. Beyond the hype and the high-flown
rhetoric is a pretty homely truth: There is no tolerance
without respect and no respect without knowledge.
The historical architects of the university understood
this. As Cardinal Newman wrote over a century ago, the
university should promote "the power of viewing many
things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to
their true place in the universal system, of understanding
their respective values, and determining their mutual de
pendence." In just this vein, the critic Edward Said has
recently suggested.
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Our model for academic freedom should therefore be the
migrant or traveler: For if, in the real world outside the
academy, we must needs be ourselves and only ourselves,
inside the academy we should be able to discover and travel
among other selves, other identities, other varieties of the
human adventure. But, most essentially, in this joint
discovery of self and other, it is the role of the academy to
transform what might be conflict, or context, or assertion
into reconciliation, mutuality, recognition, creative
interaction.
That's why I want to resist the tendency to cast the
debate in terms of the West versus the Rest, for that's the
very opposition that the pluralist wants to challenge. Plu
ralism sees cultures as porous, dynamic, and interactive,
rather than the fixed property of particular ethnic groups.
Thus the idea of a monolithic, homogeneous "West" itself
comes into question (nothing new here; literary historians
have pointed out that the very concept of "Western culture"
may date back only to the 18th century). Shorn of a dubious
genealogism, "identity" can no longer provide an Ar
chimedean point for the leverage of culture. The rhetoric of
"theft" and that of "legacy" are revealed as equally prob
lematic. Or as Walter Benn Michaels has argued.

That something belongs to our culture cannot count as a
motive for our doing it, since if it does belong to our culture
we already do it, and if we don't do it (if we've stopped or
haven't yet started doing it) it doesn't belong to our culture.
It makes no sense, for example to claim that we shouldn't
teach Shakespeare because he isn't part of our culture, since
to teach him will immediately make him part of our culture,
but it also makes no sense to claim that we should teach him
because he is part of our culture since, if we stop teaching
him, he won't be any longer.

But rather than mourning the loss of some putative
ancestral purity, we can recognize what's valuable, resil
ient, even cohesive in the hybrid and variegated nature of
our modernity.
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Cultural pluralism is not, of course, everyone's cup of
tea. Vulgar cultural nationalists, like Allan Bloom or
Leonard Jeffries, correctly identify it as the enemy. (In a
rather sinister vein, John Henrik Clark, paterfamilias of
Afrocentrism, has recently charged that the term multicul
turalism is an invention of "the Jewish educational mafia.")
These polemicists thrive on absolute partitions: between
"civilization" and "barbarism," between "black" and
"white," between a thousand versions of Us and Them. But
they are whistling in the dark.

•

Academics came to realize that it would no
longer do to talk solely among themselves,
as more Americans outside the academy
were being brought into the conversation.
The inhabitants of an ivory tower
were reminded that the tower* was part of a
larger society and supported with scarce
resources from that society.
This, I think, was the good news,
•
For whatever the outcome of the culture wars in the
academy, the world we live in is multicultural already. Mix
ing and hybridism are the rule, not the exception. As a
student of African American culture, of course. I've come to
take this kind of cultural palimpsest for granted. But
scholars in a growing number of fields are exploring the
complexities of transnational flows and the global circula
tion of culture.
Even more radically, the French anthropologist JeanLoup Amselle has showed us how the notion of discrete
ethnicities is itself an artifact of anthropology. "The defini
tion of a given culture," he writes, "is in fact the result of
intercultural relations of forces. Thus cultures aren't
situated one by the other like Leibnizean 'windowless
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monads'; they have a place in a moving ensemble that is
itself a structured field of relations." An approach to culture
that went beyond the usual assumptions of authenticity,
organicity, holism, and legacy might deprive us of some
accustomed comforts. But I think we can live with the
results.
"Pluralism," the great American philosopher John
Dewey insisted early in this century, "is the greatest
philosophical idea of our times." But he recognized it was
also the greatest problem of our times as well: "How are we
going to make the most of the new values we set on variety,
difference, and individuality—how are we going to realize
their possibilities in every field, and at the same time not
sacrifice that plurality to the cooperation we need so much?"
It has the feel of a scholastic conundrum: How can we
negotiate between the one and the many?
Today, the mindless celebration of difference has
proven as untenable as the bygone model of monochrome
homogeneity. If there is an equilibrium to be struck, there's
no guarantee we will ever arrive at it. The worst mistake we
can make, however, is not to try.

Biographical Note

Henry Louis Gates, Jr., is the W.E.B. Du Bois Professor of
the Humanities at Harvard University. A former MacAr
thur Prize Fellow, he has published extensively in the areas
of black literature and tradition. In 1989 he won the Ameri
can Book Award for The Signifying Monkey: Toward a Theory
of Afro-American Literary Criticism.

Notes on
the Dialectic of Truth and Justice
Hugh Lacey
Professor of Philosophy
Swarthmore College

’hen proposals are made in the university to increase
the diversity of the faculty and the student body, to
give greater attention to the perceptions and experiences of
a variety of cultures, and to address—cognitively and
intellectually—the historic and contemporary injustices of
U.S. society, they are often charged with being politically
motivated. As such, they are deemed to represent threats to
the proper conduct of the university. Sometimes, no doubt,
such proposals do flow from partisan political stances. And
indeed, like any other programmatic proposals for the uni
versity, they are never free from political ramifications.
Nevertheless, I wish to sketch an argument that the im
plementation of some such proposals is actually required
today for the proper conduct of the university's core tasks.
My argument is in the spirit of Henry Louis Gates
when he notes, "Ours is a world that is already fissured by
nationality, ethnicity, race, and gender," and when he goes
on to say, "The only way to transcend those divisions—to
forge, for once, a civic culture that respects both differences
and commonalities—is through education that seeks to
comprehend the diversity of human culture."
According to a long tradition, the fundamental tasks of
the university, which mutually inform each other, are the
search for the truth and the formation of students so that
they can live fulfilling lives and^ontribute constructively to
society. The significance for the university of other tasks
(such as professional training, social service, and the culti-
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vation of the mind, sensibility, and taste) derives from their
connection with the two fundamental tasks. Moreover, the
adequacy of the university's structures, programs, and
policies for carrying them out is subject to constant evalua
tion that will also take into account the resources it needs
and the social challenges of the times. The university's
principal civic responsibility, I propose, is to carry out these
two tasks with integrity, while recognizing that how they
are interpreted is value-laden through and through.
What is the pursuit of the truth? Can it even be made
sense of today when rampant relativism reigns, challenging
our sense of reality, replacing reasoned criteria for intelli
gent judgment either with uncritical and unselfconscious
tolerance, or with the wielding of power? It is where this
relativism reigns that we find the arguments for "repre
sentation, cultural equity, and self-esteem" that Gates re
jects. It is also where we find discussion marred by repeti
tion of cliches, deference to subjective feelings and moral
bullying, and where opinion polls, regulations, or simply
silence and exclusion become substitutes for critical
engagement.
Let me point to two contested interpretations of the
pursuit of the truth that figure in the current debate. One
defines the pursuit of the truth principally by activity con
ducted within the disciplines that have become departmen
talized in the university as its tradition has developed. The
other, which I favor and whose implications I will explore,
defines it by the attempt to gain a comprehensive grasp of
reality in all of its dimensions, concreteness, historicity, and
particularity; it includes- awareness and understanding of
the causes and conditions of the significant present histori
cal realities, as well as the discernment and evaluation of the
fuller possibilities for human life implicit, but not yet
realized and perhaps even suppressed, in what has cur
rently been realized. While truth, as comprehensive grasp
of reality, cannot be properly pursued without rootedness
in, and constant interaction with, the departmentalized dis
ciplines, it goes beyond them—responsible simultaneously
to the cognitive standards of the disciplines, to the "ethical
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intelligence" that Alfred Bloom discusses, and to the dia
lectic between the cognitive standards and the ethical
intelligence.
Truth, so conceived, is not an abstraction; it is at the
service of human agents, of persons who act and, in doing
so, participate in shaping the future. Truth requires recog
nition of our common humanity (another of Bloom's
themes), of the fact that our lives are deeply intertwined
with those of others through the functioning of various
institutions, and of the fact that our identities are shaped in
a variety of different ways reflective of culture, nation,
gender, history, class, religion, and other factors. Truth
remains incomplete whenever there are persons whose
identities, concrete conditions of life, and possibilities for
living fulfilled lives are not informed by it, for then it does
not reflect our shared humanity.

•

What is the pursuit of the truth?
Can it even be made sense of today
when rampant relativism reigns,
challenging our sense of reality,
replacing reasoned criteria for intelligent
judgment either with uncritical and
unselfconscious tolerance,
or with the wielding of power?
•
It is true that we share a common humanity; it is also
true that the values and presuppositions that are embodied
in many of our society's institutions—including
universities—effectively deny it, thus generating injustice.
Injustice diminishes our common humanity and thus
clouds a most fundamental truth. This point needs to be
reflected upon: While an empirical charting of historical
and contemporary human reality reveals the "deep struc-
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tures" (Bloom) of human life that are the formal foundations
of our common humanity, it also reveals between different
groups vast gulfs that produce such sufferings and diminishments for many that much of their distinctively
human character remains hidden, and such privilege for a
few that they can present themselves as the exemplars of
humanity. Such an empirical charting of the actually man
ifested human condition reveals a social world that is not
structured in service of the well-being of everyone, a world
in which a common humanity is not shared. Thus, when we
affirm the truth of our common humanity we are not ex
pressing the result of empirical investigation of what has
been achieved historically, but indicating something that it
is possible for humans to achieve. (What can be is not
identical to what has been realized.) That we share a com
mon humanity is a claim about what human beings can
become (or, at least, approach more closely toward), beings
whose lives are structured together in service of the well
being of everyone, and thus a claim that carries with it the
commitment to work toward the realization of these pos
sibilities, toward justice.

We need to learn to move around
in places where we do not tread comfortably,
to develop our capabilities to listen,
to cultivate humility, and to be sensitive
to differences—with the hope of
being able to transcend current deformations
in a world that we will shape together.
•
Injustice, therefore, not only creates tension for the
carrying out of the university's first fundamental task, the
pursuit of the truth. It also raises challenges concerning
the second, the formation of students to live fulfilling lives
and to contribute constructively to society. Addressing
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injustice—coming to understand it and the possibilities for
overcoming it—should, therefore, gain priority attention
within universities. So too should redressing the injustice
that persists within them.
If we do not pursue truth in dialectical interaction with
the quest for justice, we will, I suggest, pursue it in interac
tion with the values that are embodied in the predominant
institutions of our society, for truth cannot be pursued in
abstraction from the complete lives and social relations of
the researchers, scholars, teachers, and students. This point
underlies a critical appraisal of the current condition of the
university, but it is an appraisal that is far from being wholly
negative. When truth is pursued in association with the
values embodied in our economic, legal, and political in
stitutions, significant virtues are in play: Witness, for
example, the remarkable intellectual, scientific, and
technological products of U.S. universities, and the values
of democracy and freedom that do inform (however imper
fectly) the institutions that for the most part frame the lives
of our graduates. Many of these products and institutions
will have to play an indispensable role in any movement
toward greater justice. The significance of this achievement
should not be downplayed.
Nor should it be overestimated, lest we fail to give
proper weight and due attention to the social pathologies
that mar this nation today: homelessness, renewed racial
tensions, devastation of the inner cities, continuing glaring
inequalities in matters of wealth, employment, education
and access to justice, neglect of the elderly and the young,
drugs, crimes of violence, the feminization of poverty, en
vironmental destruction, growing indifference to the fate of
others, state complicity in terrorism and human rights viola
tions in other countries, the steady thrust of imperialism,
the celebration of war, economic dependence on military
expenditures, the trivialization and corruption of politics,
the shallowness of the mass media—and I could go on.
Coming face to face—perceptably, cognitively, institution
ally, personally—with such realities reminds us of the pos
sibilities of our common humanity that have not been
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realized and of the urgency of generating knowledge that
might inform paths toward their realization.
I regard these and other social pathologies as both the
constitutive elements and the symptoms of contemporary
injustice. On this view, therefore, they are explicable in
terms of human action and social institutions and can be
righted by action and social change. Others disagree, re
garding these phenomena largely as tragic current manifes
tations of the human condition, which is, by nature, flawed
and conflictive. They rightly maintain that what is natural is
not properly called unjust. They hold that nature (human
nature) imposes limits on the possibility of our coming to
share fully a common humanity. For them, then, justice
becomes construed as the quest for those institutions that
best structure society in the light of what is inevitable in
human nature. Many of them regard the current structures
of the advanced industrial democracies to be as close an
approximation to justice as we can expect in history, the
more so since these structures possess internal mechanisms
for reform. And some of them, keenly aware of the current
distribution of power and wealth, see no possibility for
fundamental structural change in the foreseeable future.
On either of these views, justice is not that which drives us
toward fuller societal embodiments of our common human
ity, contrary to the view that I have asserted. Those holding
these other views might be right, but is there any good
reason to take this for granted? And if not, what are
the implications for the university today?
We have here a disagreement about the range of future
social possibilities. One view holds that current structures
frame what is possible (or desirable) for the foreseeable
future. A second holds that fundamental institutional
changes could be implemented that would be necessary
conditions for human lives being structured in the service
of the well-being of everyone. These two views express the
poles of a spectrum of possibilities. Clearly the focus of
one's reflections, investigations, and experimental explana
tions will be influenced by which of these poles one tends
toward, even though antecedently we cannot know which is
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right. The record of the past and the present can only in
form, not resolve, what the future possibilities may be. The
value of justice, I suggest, pushes in the direction of explor
ing the second alternative to the utmost, without, in so
doing, discounting the claims of the first. What does this
imply?
The pursuit of truth, in dialectical interplay with jus
tice, will require today, among other things, the following
features;
1. a critical, morally sensitive charting of contempo
rary reality, with all of its variations, differences, and
conflicts;
2. a historical-sociological analysis of how this reality
has been shaped and maintained, together with an analysis
of the social and material conditions of the various modes of
life that it permits (and requires) and of the interactions and
structural relations among them;
3. attempts to diagnose what the range of future pos
sibilities may be, given the conditions and constraints of the
present; a recognition that the evaluation of these pos
sibilities will often vary with cultural perspectives; and
thence attempts to explore those social possibilities that
respect such variation to the extent that it is compatible with
the objective of justice;
•

It is true that we share a common humanity;
it is also true that the values and
presuppositions that are embodied in
many of our society's institutions—
including universities—
effectively deny it, thus generating injustice.
4. the subjecting of the practices and institutional
forms of the university itself to an ongoing scrutiny that
manifests all of the above three features.
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All of the departmentalized disciplines contribute in
dispensably, in various ways, to addressing these issues.
Nevertheless, we cannot adequately address the pos
sibilities for social transformation without entering into
contact with those who are placed outside of the privileged
mainstream of Western culture—listening to them and en
gaging in dialogue with their experiences, their histories,
their interpretations, their values, their visions, their moti
vations, their practical ideas, and their programs for trans
formation. Perception is perspectival, and the reality of the
lives of the marginalized—and, above all, the anticipatory
sources of social transformation that some of their move
ments represent—cannot be recognized (and thus cannot
be understood) from a perspective confined to the spaces
typically occupied by the university. This has special perti
nence at a moment, like the present one, when mainstream
institutions offer little hope of a transformation that might
deal with the social pathologies listed above. Unless inquiry
gains the features listed above, we cannot develop a concep
tual scheme in which the important future possibilities can
be articulated, investigated, and assessed, and we cannot
discuss intelligently in what ways current power structures
may or may not be suppressing the realization of desired
possibilities. The pursuit of the truth is incomplete, even
distorted, when it does not address these issues.
In order to generate the contact, listening, and dialogue
that I have described, the university will need to develop
new institutional forms—to develop outreach programs of
service to and collaboration with those who suffer most
from the prevailing social pathologies. We need to learn to
move around in places where we do not tread comfortably,
to develop our capabilities to listen, to cultivate humility,
and to be sensitive to differences—with the hope of being
able to transcend current deformations in a world that we
will shape together, but also with the character to maintain
constancy in the face of discord and discomfort. I em
phasize collaboration, reciprocity, and joint participation as
the spirit of such programs, so that we can begin to turn our
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intellectual activities toward the realities of the suffering, to
make them pertinent (constructively and critically) to their
movements of transformation, and to seek out mutually
fulfilling transformations—as we move toward making the
university itself an institution in which our common hu
manity and the diversity of our identities are more com
pletely recognized and celebrated. At the same time, these
programs themselves must become objects of our critical,
cognitive analysis.
Unexpected and enlivening insights can emerge from
creating such extramural programs. This paper is a reflec
tion of this fact. The viewpoint presented here has been
deepened considerably from making contact with the vision
and program of the university that has been developed at
the Central American University in El Salvador. This con
tact was made through a program, based in the spirit of
collaboration, reciprocity, and joint participation, created
by Swarthmore College and that university.
In an attempt to forestall misunderstanding, I want to
reiterate that my proposal addresses what I see currently as a
significant lack in the teaching and research activities of the
university. It flows out of a reflection on the fundamental
goals of the university. It is intended to complement, not to
displace, the departmentalized disciplines; to enhance the
substance, quality, and rigor of our curricular offerings, not
to permit voluntary service to substitute for analysis, in
quiry, and study; and to open intellectual space to those
who wish to explore the dialectic of truth and justice, not to
close off the pursuit of truth in dialectic with other values.
Should this proposal lead to successful practice, we might
anticipate that its programs would come to play a more
central role in the overall curriculum. In the absence of a
record of successful practice, there is no sound case for such
a role. But unless the space is opened up, we will never
gain the experience to assess what are the possibilities
of the university in these areas. Finding out what these
possibilities are is at the core of the university's civic
responsibility today.
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Notes
1. The principal writings on the vision of the university de
veloped at the Central American University (UCA) can be found
in J. Hassett and H. Lacey (eds). Towards a Society that Serves Its
People: The Intellectual Contribution of El Salvador's Murdered
Jesuits (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1991).
Swarthmore's relationship with the UCA was created in response
to the murder of the UCA's president, several professors, and two
women workers in November 1989. To date it has involved faculty
exchanges, translation of the articles in the book cited above, a
conference on the contents of this book, collaborative research,
and a student visit to the UCA to do research for her senior thesis.

Biographical Note
Hugh Lacey is professor of philosophy at Swarthmore Col
lege. His areas of special interest are the philosophy of
science and Latin American liberation theology. He is coor
dinator of the Philadelphia Area University Partnership
with Central American Universities. Recent articles include
"Interpretation and Theory in the Natural and Human
Sciences," Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 1990, and
"Understanding Conflicts between North and South," in
M. Dascal (ed). Cultural Relativism and Philosophy.

57847SD ™
12-1-93

30300

317

